JPRS-NEA-93-006 12 January 1993



JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

PAKISTAN

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
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Near East & South Asia

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International Affairs

Friendship With U.S. Seen of Continuing Importance

93AS0267D Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 20 Nov 92 p 6

[Editorial: "U.S.-Pakistan Friendship"]

[Text] Political circles are giving special importance to the visit by General Geoff P. Hoover, commander of the U.S. Central Command. This is his third visit to Pakistan in the last two years. It is believed that Gen. Hoover supports military and defense cooperation between Pakistan and the United States of America. He met with all high-level military and government officials in this context.

The friendly relations between Pakistan and the United States still continue, even though they have gone through many ups and downs. Pakistan has never betrayed the United States at any point during the friendship period. Even during the Gulf war, Pakistan sent its armed forces to Saudi Arabia and cooperated with the United States. In contrast, the United States has never been helpful Pakistan in difficult times, in spite of all the friendship pacts. Thus, if a military pact is made with the United States, Pakistan will not benefit from it. The United States, of course, will try to take advantage of such a pact. That is why it is trying to improve relations with Pakistan

According to some sources, now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated and the cold war has ended, the United States does not need Pakistan. However, it appears that the United States has some need to be friendly with Pakistan. It wants to maintain its military power in the Gulf. In addition, it is trying to improve its relations with the newly independent Muslim republics situated between the two great powers of Russia and China. In addition, the United States considers surrounding Iran important.

After destroying Iraq, the greatest thorn in America's side in this region is Iran. It does not want Iran to become so strong that it can challenge U.S. interests in the Gulf. The United States does not want Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian Muslim republics to form an Islamic bloc. Therefore, perhaps the United States is trying to show some green valleys to Pakistan to bring it under its sphere of influence. There is a lobby in Pakistan that wants to improve relations with the United States at any cost, and this lobby is very influential within the government. The government of Pakistan must be very alert and careful when establishing friendly relations with the United States. If, as in the past, we believe Gen. Hoover or someone like him, it would be inappropriate for Pakistan's political and military interests. Military cooperation with the United States will not be liked by Pakistan's traditional and sincere friends. Iran and China especially will not be toleratant if the United States establishes its stronghold in Pakistan and proves dangerous to their interests. Therefore, while we must maintain friendship with the United States, we should not strengthen it. Pakistan should not play the role of a defender of U.S. interests in this region. If the government agrees to such a relationship, the people would never accept it.

JUI Leader Calls U.S. Enemy of Islam, Humanity 93AS0267B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 18 Nov 92 p 5

[News Story: "U.S. Enemy of Islam and Humanity—Fazhur Rahman"]

[Text] Sakkhar (Special Correspondent)—"After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States of America is dreaming of becoming the 'God of the world.' With the end of the cold war, the United States has become an enemy of its former friends. It is an enemy not only of Islam, but also of the whole human race." These views were expressed by Fazhur Rahman while addressing a meeting of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) at Shida Nawala Gate, Lahore. He said that the most important thing at present is that all Islamic powers unite on one platform and adopt a common strategy against the protectors of American interests. He said, "The present government has failed in implementing Islam, establishing law and order, and the fronts of economic and foreign policies. Now the PDA [People's Democratic Alliancel has decided to come out into the streets. We have made it clear that we will not cooperate with them. We will not join the grand alliance; however, we are willing to work with them to bring agreements in national opinion. Additional religious and political parties will be included in the Islamic Democratic Front." While discussing the situation in Afghanistan, Maulana said, "There are many problems in the Islamic revolution. We do not have the danger of communism now. The present problem in Afghanistan was caused by General Zia. He divided the mojahedin into factions. He criticized Hekmatyar openly during his speech. Maulana Sheerani said in his speech that our enemy in this subcontinent was Britain, and it has left; however, it has left its lackeys behind, and they are always busy trying to make the United States happy. The Western powers will clash with each other soon. The United States is standing at the brink of economic destruction. Soon its name will be obliterated from the face of the earth, just like the Soviet Union's. Maulana Murad Baeivi, Maulana Ghulam Qadir Pinhor, Maulana Khalid Mehmood, and several other Muslim priests also addressed this meeting.

Imam Calls For Severance of Relations With U.S. 93AS0267C Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 11 Nov 92 p 5

[News Story: "Islamic Countries Must Sever Relations With U.S. and Its Allies"]

[Text] Gunjaranwala (JASARAT Correspondent)— 'The only reason the Muslims are insulted and embarrassed is because they give up the teachings of Allah and the Koran. When you break up your relationship with Allah, he stops taking mercy on you. That is what is now happening in the whole Islamic world. Sudan is the only country in the Islamic world that has ended its relations with the United States of America and has aligned itself with Allah. Because of this, its economic and social life is making revolutionary progress." These opinions were expressed by Asad Beufas Tamimi, imam and preacher of Masjid Aqsa at a meeting at the Jama Masjid in Model Town. He said that all Islamic countries should sever their relations with the United States of America and its allies, and should receive the mercy and goodwill of Allah. He said, "The United States will meet the same fate as the Soviet Union. The bloodletting in Afghanistan caused the downfall of the Soviet Union. The United States has also taken this attitude, and the day is not very far when the world will see America crumble." He strongly condemned the rulers of Gulf countries for using the United States and its allies for fighting against Iraq, saying that they were all enemies of Islam. He further said that the people of Pakistan would raise the flag of jihad and tohid, and that bringing about an Islamic revolution would be no problem. "The people of Pakistan are clean of mind and are able to lead the world." He praised the services and support of Ilama Ahsan Alahi Zahir, the martyr. He continued, "Pakistan is considered the center of the Islamic world, and it is sad to see its character and economic and social situations deteriorating. All this is happening because of our rulers, who have American mentalities. Otherwise, we could give examples of high character and love for Islam of the people of this country."

New Security Council Membership Opportunities Viewed

93AS0263B Karachi DAWN in English 14 Nov 92 p 9

[Article by Mahdi Masud: "Pakistan & UN Council"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Pakistan's election to the U.N. Security Council for the fifth time in its forty-five-year history gives it a useful opportunity to contribute to the shaping of a more peaceful and just world order. The election to the most prestigious and influential world body comes at a time when, with the end of the cold war, mankind is, in the words of Mathew Arnold, "between two worlds, the one dead, the other powerless to be born."

Unlike our previous terms on the Security Council when the fixed lines of the cold war left little room for progress towards the achievement of the goal of collective security, for which the League of Nations and the United Nations had been founded, member-states now have an unprecedented opportunity to move towards the realisation of this objective. In view of the commencement of our Security Council term from January 1, 1993, and the fact that our election had been more or less assured for sometime since our nomination by the Asian Group, it is hoped that the Foreign Ministry and other departments concerned have worked out a blueprint of the contribution we can make, in conjunction with like-minded countries, in advancing proposals for strengthening the framework of collective security. The development of a more effective U.N. role in safeguarding against breach of international peace and providing assistance to victims of unprovoked aggression, would enable the diversion of significant resources for urgently needed economic and social development, by providing an added sense of security to vulnerable and weak states, which constitute the bulk of the world community.

Since the twin search for enhanced security and increased resources for stepped-up economic development are the common, high priority concerns of the Third World and other states, it should be possible to mobilise significant support in the U.N., for measures directed at strengthening the structure of collective security. Pakistan's own interests in regard to the above are in harmony with those of the bulk of the world community.

The great Dutch thinker, Erasmus, had said that "in great endeavours it is enough to have tried." While the outcome of the search for enhanced, collective security may be problematical and uncertain, this should not deter us from pioneering a course founded on principle, law and justice.

To enable us to play an effective role on the Security Council, the government should, if it has not already decided to do so, strengthen our permanent mission to the U.N., not only in numbers but also with the services of our brightest and most dedicated personnel.

Referring to the standing impediment posed by the veto powers of the five permanent members, eminent legal authority Prof Leo Gross had said that "the U.N. was afflicted with the paralysis of virus at its birth." With the end of the cold war, and the falling into disuse of the practice of regular vetoes, the decks were cleared for the conceptual and organisational restructuring of the U.N. The first ever summit of the U.N. Security Council, held on Jan 1, 1992, accordingly asked the U.N. Secretary-General to submit proposals in this regard within six months, which has now been done.

Strengthening collective security, inter alia, entails the improvement and further development of the framework for peaceful settlement of disputes, including arbitration, procedures, implementation of U.N. resolutions, enforcement mechanism involving sanctions against aggressors and persistent violators of Security Council decisions, strengthening the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the expansion of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role.

The U.N. should not merely be a guardian of the *status quo*. It should also be an agent of peaceful change. Unless the U.N. machinery for pacific settlement of disputes is made more effective, the Hobson's choice between the perpetuation of an unjust *status quo* and the likely breach of peace would continue to thwart progress towards a more civilised world.

The Secretary-General has, in his recommendations to the Security Council, proposed that member-states of the U.N. should agree, by the close of the century, to refer all bilateral disputes to the World Court. The present jurisdiction of the latter is greatly circumscribed by the applicability of its obligatory jurisdiction only in cases not involving the vital interests or honour of the member-states, since every significant issue lends itself to inclusion in one or both of these categories. Moreover, the Security Council and the General Assembly would do well to consult the World Court more often for advisory opinion on legal issues.

There is also scope for expansion of the Secretary-General's role in peaceful settlement of disputes and in preventive steps to forestall crises. This is facilitated by Article 99 of the Charter which asks the Secretary-General to bring to the notice of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security.

It has been said that when history repeats itself, the price goes up (for those who fail to learn its lessons). The path to the destructive wars of this century is littered with broken international obligations on the part of aggressive and ambitious regimes. For the edifice of collective security and a peaceful world order, the fulfilment of U.N. resolutions is a necessary bedrock. Every effort should be made to mobilise support from like-minded countries on giving credibility to the world body through the implementation of U.N. resolutions, including the half-a-century old resolutions on Kashmir and the quarter-century old resolutions on Palestine. The world body's credibility and faith in its integrity and consistency is also linked to the adoption of enforcement measures involving sanctions against persistent violators of Security Council resolutions.

We may also support the Secretary-General's proposals for a standing U.N. force under Article 43 of the Charter. Such a force under U.N. command would be more evenly balanced politically and geographically than a multinational force, as was mobilised during the war against Iraq. The response so far to Boutros Ghali's appeal to member states to enter into agreement with the U.N. for earmarking national contingents has been discouraging, with only the French President having made a concrete commitment so far. The lack of response is in keeping with the tragic disinterest shown by the world body in failing to prevent or control the colossal tragedy in Bosnia. This highlights the distinction between wars of interest such as the war against Iraq and a war of conscience such as the situation in Bosnia demanded.

It may be worthwhile to sound like-minded countries on the proposal mooted in certain quarters for a standing guarantee of support by the Security Council to memberstates against unprovoked aggression. This would divert significant resources from defence to economic and social development on the part of a large number of states as a result of an enhanced sense of security which such a guarantee would provide.

Notwithstanding the obvious obstacles to such a proposal because of the greatly enhanced responsibility of the Security Council involved in the suggestion, any initiative in this regard would emphasise the desired sense of direction and concern of a large number of member-states.

A dynamic role by Pakistan in helping mobilise initiatives for advancing the goal of collective security, which is indissolubly linked to the economic and social prospects of Third World and other states, would leave a lasting imprint of Pakistan's forthcoming tenure on the Security Council. The proposed role involves painstaking planning and careful consultation with a cross-section of states.

Foreign Nations Claimed Meddling in Internal Affairs

93AS0307A Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 26 Nov 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Foreign Public Opinion Is Unduly Concerned Over Pakistan's Domestic Situation"]

[Text] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has said that once the dust of the long march settles, he will be ready to negotiate with the opposition. The government's policy is very clear and peace loving and by banning the long march on the streets, the government has not deviated from the requirements of law and order; in fact, by stopping a major lawless action, it has fulfilled its legal and constitutional duties. The prime minister has said that if the opposition train long march is conducted peacefully, the government will give it the green light. Otherwise the train march also will be crushed with severity because the overthrow of the government cannot be permitted. The government has also given some good advice to the opposition, asking it to abandon the policy of breaking the law and the constitution because it will gain them nothing even if, after the train march, they hold a helicopter and then an airplane march. Punjab's chief minister, Ghulam Haidar Wain, and federal minister of the interior, Chaudhary Shujat Hussain, have emphasized that, if the opposition should return to peaceful political activity, freedom of meetings and demonstrations would be restored.

The statements of the prime minister, the chief minister of Punjab and the federal interior minister show clearly that the government's behavior towards the opposition is in accordance with the dictates of the constitution and democracy. Even in the present heated atmosphere of confrontation, the restrictions imposed in certain cities

by the government under article 144 are limited to lawless demonstrations only. At no time has the government closed the door to negotiation. The prime minister has reiterated that the government would be ready to talk with the opposition after the dust of the long march has settled. The government's actions are within the limitations of the constitution and democracy. In their analyses of the situation, unbiased observors have placed the responsibility for the present sharp confrontation on the opposition, which started lawless demonstrations to make unconstitutional demands. However, public opinion in foreign countries is more sensitive regarding democratic conventions and is perhaps not correctly informed about our domestic situation; that is why, in a letter to the prime minister, the chairman of the U.S. Senate foreign relations committee expressed his concern "over the infringement on democratic values" in Pakistan. The fact is that up to 18 November the government had allowed the opposition the freedom to demonstrate and hold rallies throughout the country; it is also a matter of record that during the term of office of the present government, no political leader or party worker has been arrested over political differences nor were the civil rights allowed under the constitution and law ever restricted. As regards the imposition of article 144 in the city of Islamabad, these restrictions have existed over the past several years and even during the term of office of Benazir Bhutto, and it was a result of these restrictions that a public demonstration held in Islamabad to protest against Salman Rushdie's abominable book was fired upon and eight people were killed. This time, when the opposition tried to break the restrictions of article 144, the measures taken to nullify their efforts did not cause even a single death.

It is true that in order to stop the long-march demonstrators of various cities from heading towards Islamabad, the police had to use tear gas and baton charges and arrest about 1500 or 2000 political activists and a number of leaders. However, these severe measures were taken in answer to the threats of Benazir Bhutto and other opposition leaders that they would stage a sit down in Islamabad and throw out the ruling authorities from the avenues of power. Even if one accepts the opposition's claim that the long march would have remained peaceful if the government had not taken such measures, the fact remains that there was no other way to dispel the fear in the minds of the people that saboteurs and terrorists would take advantage of the huge crowds marching from Rawalpindi to Islamabad to carry out their designs. Conditions in Pakistan are not like those of the United States or other democratic countries where there is no tradition of taking to the streets to express dissent and where terrorism by political factions and foreigners are not a constant danger. That is why the U.S. Congress does not realize why restrictions under article 144 have to be occasionally invoked in order to allow normal activity to continue on the streets and to protect the lives and property of the people and national institutions. The government tried to explain to the opposition that, if the latter could guarantee that public law and order would be protected, it would be allowed to hold demonstrations and processions. The opposition's answer was to insist upon demonstrating that it had the street power to oust the government. Thus, the government was forced to take strong measures to stop the lawlessness. The U.S. Congress and other foreign institutions [representing] public opinion should try to understand Pakistan's situation. It is the responsibility of foreign embassies to inform their organizations representing public opinion of the negative and undemocratic elements in Pakistan's politics.

Regional Affairs

Hizb-i ul-Mujahedeen Leader Interviewed on Kashmir

93AS0269A in Urdu 13 Nov 92 p 2

[Kashmir's guerrilla leader Shams-ul-Haq interviewed by Arshad Aziz and Sabir Ayaz; place and date not given: "Kashmir's Freedom Movement: We Challenge Indian Domination at Every Level and on Every Front; We Have Extended Our Military Activities Away From Populated Areas to the Indian Army's Places of Refuge"]

[Text] Shams-ul-Haq is the deputy commander of Hizb-i ul-Mujahedeen, Kashmir's largest militant organization. He is one of Kashmir's top guerrilla leaders whose planning and military expertise and guerrilla raids have created fear in the hearts of 500,000 Indian troops. Indian soldiers tremble when they hear Shams-ul-Haq's name. The Indian Government has placed a bounty of several hundred thousand rupees on his head. Indian troops have raided every town and village in Kashmir hoping to capture him, but every time, Shams-ul-Haq's Kalashnikov has left behind piles of dead bodies. Stories of his courage are recounted from Khana Bal to Khanyar, Jammu to Srinagar. This man who embodies the eagle of Iqbal's poems, who has planted lags of courage and determination everywhere, arrived in Pakistan a few days ago, the land of his dreams. We asked him about recent happenings in occupied Kashmir.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] The resistance movement in Kashmir against India has now become a full-fledged jihad movement; when did it start and what stages did it go through?

[Shams-ul-Haq] The resistance movement against India in occupied Kashmir and Jammu started on the day that Indian soldiers set their loathsome feet on the land of Kashmir. The resistance struggle started when India, in order to carry out its imperialist schemes, began to lengthen the stay of its troops, which it had promised would be there only temporarily. The resistance movement continues to this day. In the beginning, Indian leaders promised the people of Kashmir in the Security Council, in the presence of the international community, that as soon as conditions returned to normal, Kashmiris would be given the power to decide their own future, and that whatever they decided in a peaceful referendum

would be accepted by India even if (as Nehru said) the decision should go against India. But as time passed, India tightened its economic, military, and cultural grip on Kashmir. By granting concessions and privileges to opportunistic politicians, India hoped to turn public opinion in its favor. But the people of Kashmir realized from the very beginning what India's real intentions were. At first they asked for their right of selfdetermination through peaceful, democratic, and constitutional means. However, when India, in order to carry out its nefarious schemes, began to employ abominable methods to deprive Kashmiris of their right to freedom, the people could bear it no longer. They held demonstrations, rallies, and strikes to express their dissatisfaction and anger towards India. The truth is that the people of Jammu and Kashmir refused from the very first day to accept India's presence in the province and started to think of ways to liberate their land. Kashmiris continued to take part in Indian elections but it is as clear as day that their sole purpose in doing so was to defeat pro-Indian candidates and thus demonstrate their hatred for India. In none of the elections did the Kashmiris vote in favor of India and its agents; the Kashmiris always voted in favor of freedom although their decisions were later altered through fraudulent means. Every year, on 26 August, India's Republic Day, Kashmiris have used the occasion to unveil India's dictatorial nature. Kashmiris expressed their hatred for India every August 15 by observing Black Day; and on August 14, they waved Pakistani flags in the face of Indian singers [of Indian patriotic songs] and expressed their undying love for Pakistan. In their writings and speeches, the people of Kashmir always demanded: Indian dogs, leave our Kashmir. A Kashmiri Muslim hates India and its agents more than he dislikes eating pork. History is witness to the fact that Kashmiris have thrown stones at Indian police and soldiers and in return have suffered tear gas, baton charges, and shots. The time came when Kashmiri youths began to throw hand grenades and fire bombs at Indian barracks; they burned Indian flags at crossroads; set fire to effigies of Indian leaders and copies of the Indian constitution. When all their efforts proved useless, in 1987 the Kashmiri mujahedeen started a regular military struggle based on modern methods. India was under the impression that with the passing of the old generation, the new would adopt Hindu ways and that the spirit of freedom would die away. India also thought that by buying a few immoral politicians, it would persuade the Kashmiris to abandon their stand. But India has been proved wrong on both assumptions. There were young heroes of freedom left in Kashmir, especially Tehrik-i-Islami and its brother organizations, who courageously resisted Indian aggression on every front. Tehrik-i-Islami challenged India's political domination at every level and on every front and used India's own forums against it. Tehrik-i-Islami countered India's cultural onslaught by keepinng alive the province's centuries old Islamic culture and traditions. It is because of Tehrik-i-Islami's 44-year-old struggle that an entire generation of Kashmiris has launched a jihad against India. As a result of the efforts of Tehrik-i-Islami, Kashmir's

jihad is being carried on today on traditional Islamic lines. With heart and mind bent on the achievement of a single goal, armed with patience, perseverance, and trust in God, Muslim youths are today fighting against the world's worst imperialist power.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] How do the militant organizations, which are fighting against India in occupied Kashmir at the present time, rank in regard to manpower and military operations?

[Shams-ul-Haq] At the beginning of the present jihad movement, numerous militant organizations came into being, each with its own views; because of the multiplicity of organizations, the ideological identity of Kashmir's jihad started to fade. Consequently, we tried to reduce the number of organizations to as few as possible and to merge small organizations into large ones to achieve as far as possible a singleness of purpose among people fighting for a common cause. Our efforts were very successful and at present, all mujahedeen in occupied Kashmir who possess Kalashnikovs belong to eight or 10 organizations. In manpower and militant operations, Hizb-i ul-Mujahedeen is the leading organization; more than 60 percent of Kashmiri mujahedeen belong to it. It is Kashmir's largest militant organization with a membership of more than 10,000 mujahedeen. Hizb-i ul-Mujahedeen enjoys the support and patronage of Sayed Ali Gilani, Kashmir's great leader. Sayed Salahuddin is the organization's supreme commander.

Al Jihad is second in manpower; its commander in chief is the famous Mujahed Sheikh Aziz. The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front is third in rank; Javed Ahmad Mir is their commander in chief and it also has many members. Regarding the other organizations, this is how they rank in manpower: Al Umar (its commander in chief Mushtaq Zargar was recently arrested); Jamiatul-Mujahedeen; Hizbullah; Hizb-ul-Momenin; Pasdaran-i-Inqilab-i Islami; Al Barq; and Tehrik-ul-Mujahedeen.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] As you have mentioned, Hizb-i ul-Mujahedeen is the valley's largest militant organization. Would it be possible to tell us its major military operations over the past year?

[Shams-ul-Haq] Undoubtedly, Hizb-i ul-Mujahedeen is occupied Kashmir's largest militant organization that is rattling India's nerves. The Hizb's most important achievement in Kashmir's military history has been to move military action away from cities and carry it far from populated areas to the Indian army's places of refuge. Second, the Hizb spread the circle of militancy out of the valley of Kashmir to Jammu and Ladakh. At every step, every corner, in wilderness and on plateaus, the Hizb has kept the Indian troops busy and harried. The Hizb has targetted India's major military installations.

The Hizb set off a fearsome explosion in the office of the director general of Srinagar's police on 23 January, the day on which, in a secret meeting held by the Indian

police and high-level military officers, the final touches were being given to arangements for the celebration of India's Republic Day and Manohar Joshi's Ekata Yatra lunity marchl. The explosion destroyed the office of the inspector general of police; about 20 high military and civil officials were killed or wounded and important and sensitive Indian documents were destroyed. Hizb youth also launched rockets at India's communications center in Pari Parbat and destroyed it. In Baramula, the Hizb attacked a large Indian army fuel depot and set fire to it, inflicting a loss of several million rupees. The Hizb has occupied the Jammu Srinager highway sometimes for hours, sometimes for weeks, blocking the movement of Indian troops. During this year alone, the Hizb has killed several Indian soldiers and wounded thousands on this highway. By building the Wooler dam on the river Jhelum, India wanted to inflict economic disaster on Pakistan: India had spent billions of rupees on the dam's preliminary project; however, Hizb youths attacked with rockets and completely destroyed the construction. Last month, young men of the Hizb occupied the Dodah district of Jammu after a three hour battle; several [Indian] solders were wounded and dozens were taken prisoner and a large amount of arms and ammunitions was captured by the mujahedeen. There were several other undertakings as well which I cannot mention because of [security] considerations and also lack of

[NAWA-I-WAQT] There are at present 500,000 Indian soldiers stationed in Kashmir, whereas there are only a few thousand mujahedeen. How can a few thousand demoralize the Indian soldiers to the point that they are forced to withdraw from Kashmir?

[Shams-ul-Haq] However large the numbers of the standard bearer troops of idolatry and oppression, they are like falling walls when faced with faith and determination. Indian troops now realize that they are maintaining an unnatural and dictatorial hold on a foreign land; the continuous attacks of the mujahedeen have dispatched several thousand soldiers to hell and wounded many; the soldiers have lost their will and the sense of security, and they are homesick and concerned about the future of their children. They carry out orders in Kashmir like rented beasts of burden; mentally the soldiers have accepted the fact that Kashmir is a foreign land and does not belong to them and that they will eventually have to leave it. Divine help, the support of the people, and the courage and determination of the mujahedeen have broken the morale of Indian troops; lacking any social or public support, Indian soldiers are in a state of frustration; in their despair, they are resorting to the use of narcotics. God willing, an Indian soldier returning from duty in Kashmir will not be capable of fighting in any part of the world. Recently, the Central Reserve Police and Border Security Forces sued the Indian Government in court maintaining that their job was to maintain law and order, not to fight wars.

The statement of the chief of the Indian Army Staff has appeared in the press in which he said that Indian troops

should be brought back from Kashmir. Otherwise India would not remain in a position to fight outside aggression. These and other such facts prove the falling morale of Indian troops.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] Different circles have different versions of the watchword of the present jihad in occupied Kashmir. What are the facts?

[Shams-ul-Haq] The people of Jammu Kashmir, political leaders, and mujahedeen have only one aim in mind, namely, to be liberated from India and to become a part of a great Islamic country (Pakistan). There are no supporters of secularism or nationalism in the movement. There are a few people who talk of independence but we are sure that one day they will also join us, and shoulder to shoulder we will advance towards our goal. By the grace of God, progress is being made towards this objective.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] Recently, an agreement was arrived at between the Hizb and the Liberation Front; what was the basis of this agreement and what results are expected?

[Shams-ul-Haq] The [success] of the jihad movement of Kashmir demands that all mujahedeen organizations form a wall of steel to sweep Brahman imperialism out of Jammu Kashmir; the mujahedeen should not allow tyrant India to profit from any disagreement among them. Secondly, in the beginning, the Front considered both India and Pakistan occupiers and thought that the war of liberation should be waged against both countries. However, their stand has undergone a welcome change, and they have made an agreement with us to the effect that it is first of all necessary to unite against India and win freedom, after which, if the people should wish to join Pakistan, the Front would not oppose their wishes. We consider this change in the Front's stand a step towards reality, and we hope that positive results will ensue for the freedom movement from this agreement.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] If world powers should try to divide Kashmir between India and Pakistan, what course would the Kashmir mujahedeen follow?

[Shams-ul-Haq] The people of Kashmir have been aware of such a plot from the very beginning, and they do not trust Western powers, nor do they expect any beneficial action from that source. We know that as the jihad movement progresses towards success, the enemies of Islam and pro-India lobbies will resort to various schemes to spread dissension among the Kashmiris. The simple fact is that as India faces military, political, economic, and diplomatic defeat, it will use the division of Kashmir as its last weapon; but we will not barter away the sacrifices of the 1947 martyrs of Jammu; God willing, we will liberate the entire province from Indian control and despotism and join Pakistan.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] What hopes did you have from the Islamic world and the people of Pakistan, and were these hopes realized?

[Shams-ul-Haq] Apart from their trust in God and His prophet, the Kashmiris place their hopes and desires in Pakistan. The taunts leveled at us by insiders and outsiders that we are Pakistanis are not new; we have been hearing them since 1947. The Kashmiris are proud of identifying themselves with Pakistan. Pakistan's political, diplomatic, and moral help to the Kashmir jihad is a matter of pride for us. However, we are surprised that our Pakistani brothers do not express their unhappiness and agitation at the cruelties and oppression we are suffering. It is not possible that, when any part of the body is being injured, the other parts should not feel pain as well.

Kashmir Issue Must Be Solved First

BK2411140592 Karachi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 13 Nov 92 p 5

[Editorial: "The Failure of the Talks on Siachen—Nothing Surprising"]

[Text] During a news briefing at the Foreign Office the other day. Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan expressed regret over the failure of the foreign secretary-level talks in the Indian capital, New Delhi, and attributed it to India's noncompliance with the June 1989 agreement on Siachen. India has been using every opportunity since 1947 to cause Pakistan trouble, and its occupation of Siachen was yet another attempt in this regard. After the formation of Pakistan, the demarcation of the India-Pakistan border was completed up to a village named Akhoro, and the rest of the area was declared as noman's land. This was clearly stated in the Karachi agreement of 27 July, and this situation existed until 1965. After the 1971 war, the issue again came up for discussion and the area up to Giang La was recognized as the Line of Control. Pakistan did not deploy its troops in Siachen, recognizing it as a no-man's land, but the mountaineers seeking to reach the glacier always obtained permission from Pakistan to visit the area. However, in 1983-84, India opened a new front of confrontation with Pakistan by silently dispatching troops to the region. India attaches importance to Siachen partially because of Azad Kashmir, the Karakoram Highway, and China. Therefore, by sending troops to the region, India might have intended to achieve the following objectives:

i. occupy the Karakoram Highway;

ii. advance forward in the region after suffering defeat at the hands of China in the 1962 war in the valley of the Northeast Frontier area;

iii. force Pakistan to extend the Line of Control up to the glacier;

iv. pose a threat to the northern areas and Azad Kashmir;

v. occupy Baltoro and ask foreign mountaineers to seek permission from India for reaching the mountain peak K-2;

vi. render ineffective the Pakistan-China agreement which recognizes Pakistan's control up to Karakoram Pass. India has, however, failed to achieve any of these objectives so far, and now, after the defeat and disintegration of the former Soviet Union, it has no chance at all of achieving those goals.

When Pakistan came to know of the Indian occupation and its designs in the region two years later, it retaliated by occupying Giang La and Yarma La, thereby ending India's military supremacy. But the dispute has remained unresolved thus far in spite of Pakistan's sincere efforts. According to an estimate, India is spending 30 million rupees per day to maintain its occupation of Siachen, because it has to use helicopters even for transporting manpower, food, medicines, and residential facilities; whereas Pakistan spends only 3 million, 10 times less than India, because it can access the region by land.

Late President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq and former Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, in their meetings with late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, continued to press for a solution to this problem, but India has always adopted a negative attitude. The negotiations held at the levels of foreign and defense secretaries have also not yielded any results. Even the agreement on Siachen signed during the rule of Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto and India's Rajiv Gandhi in 1979 has not been implemented thus far, which was pointed out by the foreign secretary during his news briefing.

The fact is that under its long-term strategy, India is trying to fulfill its expansionist designs, and whenever any opportunity becomes available, it displays its ambitions by taking practical steps. But, as a shrewd and crafty enemy, it also wants to shield its designs by making pronouncements about compromise and peace and expressing its desire for better relations with neighbors. Therefore, it overlooks problems like the Kashmir dispute or the return of the bodies of the innocent martyrs and says it wants to keep the doors of such negotiations open. This would not expose India's real aggressive designs to the international community while it continues to blow its trumpet of democracy and peace and tranquility.

We have already written in these columns on several occasions that we should not commit any mistakes in understanding India. The Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, on the basis of their experience of living with the Hindus for 1,000 years, came to the conclusion that only a separate motherland could rid them of the hegemony and domination of the Hindus. But, it is not known why, in spite of past experiences, our civil and military bureaucracy is trying to extend the hand of friendship to India, staging a show of negotiations, sometimes on Siachen and sometimes on economic and commercial

issues, by overlooking real issues, a policy which never yields any results. The fact is that, as Shaharyar Khan has admitted in his news briefing, unless the core issue of Kashmir is resolved, no other problem can be resolved nor can negotiations on any issue make any progress. Apparently, India's negative attitude is the greatest obstacle in the way of a Kashmir settlement. Therefore, the Pakistani nation was not a bit surprised at the failure of the negotiations on Siachen. They would have been surprised had any side given any hint of success at these talks.

Therefore, it is better for us to consider India as an enemy-state and tell it categorically that so long as it does not stop its oppression and brutalities against the Kashmiri people and give them the right of self-determination in accordance with the UN resolutions, Pakistan-India negotiations will bear no fruit. We should, instead of wasting our energy on these secondary issues, concentrate on telling and convincing the Islamic community and the entire world that the greatest obstacle in the way of peace in the Indian subcontinent is India, which has been violating the basic human rights of the Kashmiri people and has unleashed a reign of terror against them: and that they should impose economic sanctions against India to force it to accept the Kashmiri people's demand for freedom and stop the ongoing oppression and brutalities. This is the only real task we need to accomplish. The reason for India's participation in the negotiations on Siachen is the material loss that it has been suffering in the form of 30 million rupees per day. Petty-minded Hindus are always afraid of material loss, and this is the only weapon that can be used effectively against them. Appeals and negotiations—the tools that India favors to hide its real face—will yield no results.

Paper Points to Presence of Indian Agents in Sindh

BK1212140992 Lahore JANG in Urdu 14 Nov 92 p 4

[Editorial: "Indian Agents Active in Sindh"]

[Text] Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan People's Party cochairperson, in an interview with Voice of Germany has said that the Army is a national institution and we hope that it will let the people make decisions and will not take sides in any political strife. So far as Ms. Benazir Bhutto's remark that the Army is a national institution is concerned, it is an established and irrefutable fact. However, her argument that Nawaz Sharif has sent the Army to Sindh to fulfill his own political objectives is not correct. The Army has also been called in the past to maintain law and order in Sindh. No civilian government could deal with the situation in Sindh without the Army's help.

The Army has been sent to Sindh to protect the life and property of the people, and it has achieved considerable success in improving the situation despite its limited powers. The situation in Sindh is so complicated that agents of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing, RAW,

have infiltrated the government institutions and are working in government offices. A large number of accomplices and patrons of bandits and RAW agents had been working in the police force in Sindh. The Sindh police force has now been cleansed. But one cannot claim that saboteurs and terrorists have been totally wiped out from the ranks of the police. In view of the horrid revelations made by an agent of the Indian RAW, it is important to scrutinize and keep a strict vigil on all people working in government, semigovernment, and private sectors in Sindh. The revelations made about high government officials, particularly some bureaucrats and four commissioners of Karachi, make it easy to understand why law and order could not be restored in Sindh. The agent has also confessed to his links with the Mohajir Qaumi Movement, testifying to the facts which have come to light about this organization.

Given this situation, we feel that not only should the deployment of the Army in Karachi and Sindh be extended, but the Army should definitely be given more power. India is playing a role similar to that which it played in East Pakistan, and a slight dereliction on our part would lead us to a new tragedy. The prevailing situation in the country is the outcome of the stiff confrontation and rivalry between the government and the opposition, and we can justifiably hope that the Army will not be a party to this confrontation. However, if this confrontation takes a violent turn and the government fails to control the situation, then, keeping the past in view, it will be difficult to rule out the possibility of an Army intervention.

'Independent Radio Balochistan' Resumes Broadcast

BK1512074592 Lahore DAILY PAKISTAN in Urdu 14 Dec 92

[Editorial by Intezar Ahmad: "Independent Radio Balochistan Resumes Broadcasts"]

[Summary] Lahore DAILY PAKISTAN in Urdu on 14 December publishes a 300-word report attributed to its special correspondent Intezar Ahmad from Hab under the title "Independent Radio Balochistan Resumes Broadcasts." The report, published on the first page and continued on the fourth, quotes an unnamed weekly newspaper from Balochistan as saying that the "Independent Radio Balochistan has resumed its broadcasts after (?20) years," but this time, the station introduces itself as the radio of "Islami Balochistan." The report adds that "the location of this clandestine radio station is unknown. It is also unknown whether it is operating from a mobile van or from a boat or a ship in the Indian Ocean or in the Persian Gulf. The weekly newspaper says that the radio broadcasts propaganda for an independent socialist republic for the Balochis living in both Pakistan and Iran. (?In the past), the station was based in Iraq, which has been confirmed by experts."

The report says the broadcasts from this radio station are heard in some Pakistani areas until 1430 GMT only from time to time, adding that "these broadcasts are not heard (?clearly) in Quetta. Since the broadcasts are heard in Iranian Balochistan, it is definite that the unknown radio station does not operate from Pakistani territory. The weekly newspaper further writes that the Independent Radio Balochistan carries propaganda against religious-minded Balochis of Iranian Balochistan and the Balochi accent of these broadcasts is specifically similar to the Balochi language spoken in Iranian Balochistan. Certain political sources have been quoted as saying that the aforementioned radio station is based in Iraq and it is used to broadcast the activities of a guerrilla group that has been fighting against Iran."

Internal Affairs

Political Situation Claimed Deteriorating

93AS0307B Karachi JANG in Urdu 23 Nov 92 p 3

[Editorial: "The Situation is Going From Bad to Worse"]

[Text] Almost a week has passed since the announced date of PDA's [People's Democratic Alliance] long march, but the country's political climate remains unclear and disturbed, and in one respect, it has become even worse because of the bitter and hardened attitudes of the protagonists. During a speech at a seminar in Lahore, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said bluntly that he is not ready to shake the hand of the daughter of the man who was responsible for Pakistan's partition. The nation not only does not support the PDA but has even spurned it and no matter whether he should be martyred or survive as a hero, he would not bow before them. He said that the long march is a conspiracy to destroy Pakistan's good name and stop the country's progress. Eighty-percent of his task still remains to be done and he will leave only after it is accomplished.

The PDA leadership, on the other hand, is turning down any possibility of negotiation. Farooq Laghari, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and other leaders have refused to enter into unconditional discussions, saying that talks could be held only on a one-point agenda: setting up a caretaker government to hold general elections. The Air Marshall has even said that the statement he made in a 1977 letter to the Armed Forces, to the effect that they should refuse to obey illegal and immoral orders, still holds true, and that General Asif Nawaz should pay heed to the advice.

Unfortunately, the opposition continues to insist on its long march. The other day, as a result of its appeal, there was a total strike in Quetta and all business centers were shut down. The "train long march" program is still in effect and all of PDA's notables are gathering in Karachi to take part in it; Benazir Bhutto herself is going to participate. The government has completed arrangements to prevent the Bhutto ladies from leaving their

houses by throwing a cordon around Bilawal House and number 70 Clifton. But it is not possible to predict how successful the government will be, because on 18 November, in spite of all the precautions taken by the government, Benazir Bhutto not only succeeded in leaving her house but she was also able to overcome all obstacles and reach Liaqat Bagh. Should the train long march be able to start out with PDA leaders, the government will have to make security and precautionary arrangements at all the train stations. A large part of the police force is already busy preventing PDA demonstrations and rallies in dozens of cities and has been clashing with the demonstrators. The photographs of these incidents have appeared in the national press. Now the police will be mired down in a new activity.

On the one hand, the opposition is busy with these activites, and on the other hand, the federal parliamentary secretary has announced that the prime minister has summoned a meeting of IJI [Islami Jumhoori Ittehad] and its supporting parliamentary parties to discuss plans for defeating the opposition's movement. The prime minister is also contemplating starting a movement, to be initiated in Multan, in an effort to counter the opposition's movement. The government has the right to take political steps to counter the opposition but the fact remains that if the protagonists stand pat on their present positions, the country will suffer continuous disturbances, which will affect the economy and public order adversely. Former chief of land forces, General Aslam Beg, has said that foreigners who will be participating in his international seminar starting on 24 November are already calling and asking about conditions in Pakistan and wondering whether they should come to Pakistan or not. Prospects for foreign investment in Pakistan are suffering a setback even before the anticipated disturbances. If this situation continues, the chances for foreign investment will dim even further, and the country will sustain a serious loss. One can ascertain the effects within the country of this confrontation by the reported declines in the Karachi and Lahore stock exchanges and the fall in the prices of the shares of most companies. All these facts illustrate the harm the country is sustaining in every aspect because of the political confrontation.

Is there any ray of hope left in this darkness? According to one report, the president and chief of army staff [COAS] discussed the situation during their recent meeting and agreed upon a number of measures to improve conditions. We do not know what the president and COAS discussed and agreed upon since the reports published have been contradictory. A senior British contemporary has said that the president approved of the measures taken by the government to counter the long march; whereas another report said that the president had advised the government to negotiate with the opposition. The reports published over the last few days say that General Asif Nawaz is emphasizing a political solution of the present issue. No definite conclusion can be drawn by these different and somewhat contradictory

reports; however, we do not hesitate in saying that the two elders we have mentioned are the only individuals who have the ability and the power to lead the country out of the present cul-de-sac. True, their roles are determined by the constitution, and under normal conditions. they cannot interfere in political battles. But abnormal conditions impose special responsibilities on elder statesmen and patriots. Thus, we think that those circles who possess the moral courage to undertake a role aimed at reform should become active; and, before a point of no return is reached and the nation's interests suffer irreparable harm, they should try as hard as possible to set the country back on the right track. The political leadership of the government and the opposition should realize that, if the situation deteriorates any further, they will be held responsible in the eyes of the nation and of history. The prolongation of confrontation and deterioration can have unpleasant and unexpected results: hence, it would be advisable to bring the situation under control before it is too late. The referendum mentioned by the prime minister could be a solution if an agreement is reached regarding the method of proceedure; we are afraid, however, that in view of the state of confrontation which exists between the protagonists, a referendum would leave the quarrel unsolved. Thus, instead of trying a new experiment, it would be better to find a way to start the well known political dialogue, and the two elder statesmen [the president and the army chief] should direct their efforts to the same end.

Contradictions Seen in Jatoi's Stance, Demands 93AS0266A Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 8 Nov 92 p 10

[Article by Nadim Anbaloi: "Contradictions in Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi's Politics"]

[Text] Former prime minister and president of the National People's Party (NPP), Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, has been active in our country's politics for a long time. He belongs to those groups of rich landlords of Sindh who have special habits and character. These rich landlords do not consider politics a way to serve the people; politics is a hobby for them. These landlords, rich people, and chiefs have various kinds of hobbies, such as quail fights, riding horses, and horse racing. They always need some kind of hobby to pass their time. Many of these rich people have made politics their hobby. For them, the whole country is their own land, and the people are just their subjects. During the last halfcentury, they have practiced a kind of politics, which shows that they have made it impossible for poor but extremely able people to enter politics. All assembly seats are occupied by landlords, and now, industrialists. These rich people have made our nation's politics corrupt and dirty. It is because of them that our whole society is suffering from corruption. Dishonesty, misappropriation, bribery, nepotism, and suppression of the weak are not considered wrong. Instead, people who stay away from these evil practices are looked upon with hatred.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto brought Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi into politics. In the beginning, he enjoyed the fruits of a federal cabinet position, and later, he became the chief minister of Sindh. He has the unique position of being a protege of the late Mr. Bhutto. If Mr. Bhutto had never looked at him with the mentor's eyes, then perhaps he never would have entered politics. Mr. Jatoi must have been raised by people who specialize in starting scandals in politics. The fact is that his politics have been rampant with scandals. Mr. Jatoi recently announced, "What happened during my prime ministership will be exposed soon." His declaration might be important for some simpletons, and they might be surprised by Mr. Jatoi's declaration. In my opinion, all this has no importance. As the poet said, "These trapeze artists deceive you openly!" If something happened during Mr. Jatoi's political career that he has been hiding, then he would not have made this threat. He should have shared this with the nation when he left his position. Let us grant for a second that a few things happened during his prime ministership that were detrimental to our national interests. Why didn't he identify those at that time? Why didn't he think it necessary to unmask those people in front of the nation at that time? If Mr. Jatoi was not interested in political consideration, he would have resigned from the prime ministership. Instead of putting the medal of the prime ministership on his lapel, he should have thrown it out and informed the nation of the specific incidents. In that case, we would have given some weight to his talks, and people would have shown some respect for him. However, Mr. Jatoi did not think it appropriate to take this step at that time. He was assured that the new assembly that would emerge after the NA [National Assembly] elections would make him the leader of the house, and that the prime ministership would be in his pocket. However, when Mr. Nawaz Sharif destroyed all his dreams and the National Assembly gave the prime minister's chair to Nawaz Sharif and not to Mr. Jatoi, he suddenly felt that national interests were greatly affected.

Now Mr. Jatoi is leading those politicians whose goal is to cause political instability, hurt democracy, and create an atmosphere in the country that will not only weaken but also destroy the present government. Whether these politicians succeed in their goal, only time will tell. However, Mr. Jatoi has this opportunity to become a leader by bringing various political parties together. Now he is issuing statement after statement, and a lot of noise is being raised about his "arrival." All kinds of opinions that were not expressed before are being expressed openly now. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Jatoi is following Mr. Bhutto's footsteps in politics and is following the practice of sensationalism in politics. Mr. Bhutto was the foreign minister in Ayub Khan's cabinet and was present at the Indian-Pakistani talks held in Tashkent because of Soviet Union efforts. He was the member of the team under the leadership of Ayub Khan that represented Pakistan. As a result of these negotiations, India and Pakistan signed the Tashkent Pact, and all troops were returned. As long as Mr. Bhutto remained cabinet

minister with Ayub Khan, he kept quiet. As soon as he was removed from the cabinet, he first went abroad, and on his return, he made the Tashkent Pact the focus of his politics. In his speeches and statements he succeeded in giving the country the impression that Ayub Khan lost the game that he won in the war on a table in Tashkent. In other words, he accused Ayub Khan of endangering the country and betraying the nation. However, his slogan also met with the same fate as the slogans about fighting with India for 1,000 years. Mr. Bhutto became chief civil marshal administrator and later the president of the country. He also adorned the prime minister's chair: however, the cat never came out of the Tashkent bag on which he based his election campaign. Even today, the nation is unaware of the conspiracy that was supposedly hatched in Tashkent. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Jatoi has the honor of being the favorite disciple of Mr. Bhutto. Now he is trying to use his late teacher's technique and modus operandi. He is making statements about unveiling the incident that took place during his prime ministership, even though he was an equal partner in all those "happenings." Actually, all of this happened according to his wishes. That is why he never tires of begging forgiveness from Allah and the nation. It is ridiculous that when he was the caretaker prime minister, he kept assuring the nation that there would be no fraudulent practices in the elections, and that the election process would be fair and nonpartisan. Later, when the election results were declared, Mr. Jatoi was defeated. He was sure that the House would elect him prime minister and make him its leader. However, when his wish was not fulfilled, he changed his stand slowly. It became important for him to share with the nation "what had been happening" during his prime ministership. Political protocol demands that he tell all this to the nation without making accusatory statements, and that he should have announced his retirement from politics. After all, he had failed to stop these conspiracies as the prime minister. Their position demanded that they protect the nation's interests.

It is our nation's misfortune that when a person is in power, he believes that every illegitimate action is legitimate, and that when he falls from power, every legitimate action appears illegitimate to him. The mistakes, vested interests, and ineffectiveness of these leaders shocked the nation again and again and increased the problems in our country. I wish the people in power would sense these and stop taking these petty actions. They are not appropriate to their positions. After these politicians and adventurers leave power, they begin to see problems and defects in our society that actually were products of their own actions. Even today, the negative habits, stubbornness, and false egos are rampant in our politics, and Mr. Jatoi cannot say that he is above these. Why does he think that democracy is in danger now, when he was one of those people who stabbed this democracy in its back? We can see the blood of democracy on his hands. We can clearly say that during the last 45 years, people from the same group had been playing with our country's fate. Only their faces were different. They do not think the goal should be to remove ignorance and illiteracy from the country or to rid the nation of unemployment. They do not think that providing hospitals and treatment to the people is important, or that protecting the honor of women or family life is important. They do not think that they have to stop the criminals, make sure that the lives of our people are protected, and eradicate poverty from our country. They do not do things for Pakistan, but for their own fame and glories. They want to become the sole owners of all resources in this country. They want to, as the poet said, "console the people of this country with toys."

They have been busy showing green valleys and then murdering the desires and wishes of the people. These people have made it impossible for the poor, helpless, and gentle people to live peacefully. Their lives are full of bitterness and darkness. They cannot even see the light of day. Meanwhile, the ministers and advisers of the government issue statement after statement just to add up numbers. They have adopted this hobby, and their statements sound like the dialogues read by the villain of a Puniabi film. Meanwhile, each of our ruling parties has developed the habit of accusing their opponents of treachery. When these government leaders start to establish factories that produce traitors, no one seems to think it is necessary to knock at a court door to prove that anyone is really a traitor. Tell us, who will believe them? Treachery is a curse, and we must be careful when we use it. No government is composed of angels. Faults are possible in every person. Still, we should learn from our past and try to rectify the old problems. The most important thing is that a formal democratic relationship must be established between the government and the opposition. The prime minister did try to do that; however, because of the extremist views of people on both sides, the opposition and the government did not give up their stubborn stands. Both parties should not stick to their points so stubbornly that there is no room for negotiation. Our greatest misfortune at this time is that we have no personage capable of stopping this confrontational situation. There is no one who, instead of being a spectator, can bring the government and the opposition to sit at a table and remove these differences which have reached a critical stage. As a result of all this, the teams composed of the government and the opposition are in fact playing; however, there is no referee or umpire to monitor their game. There is no one to tell either side when a foul is being committed. This situation was created because, instead of the politics of principle, we have the politics of vested interests in our country. The landlords, the rich people, and the industrialists are destroying the people in their private war. Every cog in this country is being loosened. We wish that someone would use his head and ask, who will benefit from this kind of politics—the nation or its enemies? This nation does not belong to one person. It does not belong to a political party, either. It belongs to hundreds of millions of people who live in Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh, and Sarhad.

Analyst Urges Continuing Role for MQM 93AS0262A Karachi DAWN in English 20, 21 Nov 92

[Articles by M.B. Naqvi: "Parts I and II: Urdu-Speakers' Predicament"; boldface words and quotation marks as published]

[20 Nov p 11]

[Text] Meeting MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] Supremo Altaf Hussain in London gave one a useful insight. It turned out that one was staying in the same north London suburb as he did. It was set up by a ring to MQM office answering machine. Response was prompt. Mr. Altaf Hussain graciously had me picked up and later dropped at my place. The meeting itself took place in an austerely-furnished MQM office and apparently Mr. Altaf Hussain lived not too far in another house.

In the room where one was ushered in two young men were present. Just like the two other young men who had brought me to the venue, they tried to impress upon me the wide scale of Army's operations against both the MQM and the Mohajir community in Sindh. The two seemed determined to educate me. Perhaps it was their way to keep the visitor engaged while their chief arrived that took about 15 minutes. One did one's best to discourage them from further haranguing by monosyllabic responses.

The office contained nondescript old sofa set, a few chairs and a table with two telephones. There was also a Notice Board with several notices hanging from it. The only other equipment in the room was a fax machine, a photo copier and a few files.

When he did arrive, Mr. Altaf Hussain looked out of the sorts. His health did seem to occasion questions. He was shivery. He seemed, above all, shabby both in dress and demeanour. The effect was enhanced by several days' stubble on the chin. He was courteous enough. He was also forthcoming and relatively open, though inclined to mount the pulpit.

Needless to say that most of the time one spent with him—100 to 105 minutes—he spoke and kept to the topic of his own choosing: explaining at great length, with specific instances and statistics, the large-scale suppression and oppression that had been let loose against both the MQM in particular and Mohajir community in general. He gave statistics, as collected by an Action Committee appointed by him after an extensive survey in the later part of October.

For instance, he gave the figure of 400 mutilated bodies having been found in Karachi and Hyderabad, giving a newspaper clipping to establish the case. Whether they were men of MQM or some other was hard to establish, though its presumption of their being MQM workers was likely enough as no one else has claimed them and the number of MQM workers said to be missing is much larger. And so on with a lot more facts and figures that he

provided in shape of either newspaper clippings or MQM (UK Unit's Press release).

The meeting was not a Press interview; one had explained one's position as not being a straight reporter. Although the figures of various casualties and the number of arrests and quantum of torture and other mistreatment by law-enforcing agencies (of all kinds) is a fit subject for discussion but that was not one's focus. There is no doubt about the large scale of arrests and interrogation of people suspected of association with MQM. The practice of police (and other so-called sensitive agencies) taking some family members of a suspect as for his surrender, by now, is common knowledge.

Everybody knows what the interrogation by so-called law-enforcing agencies implies in real life. One is also aware of the actual behaviour of the various agencies—police, para-military forces and army personnel—towards the supposed supporters and sympathisers of MQM and their general attitude toward Karachi's public. Mr. Altaf Hussain did not have to underline it. It would be futile for me to discuss the veracity of the MQM claims or to tally them with what the official sources say.

Irrespective of the exact number of arrests and torture or mistreatment cases, arresting relatives as hostages for declared or suspected offenders and actually unexplained deaths of many in suspicious circumstances do provide the MQM with a cause to protest. This is not to say that the others have no case against MQM, which subject is not under discussion here. What can be taken as a fact is that law-enforcing agencies have gone about the business with a strange zeal and have been committing excesses; it is hard to rebut Mr. Altaf Hussain when he claims that the law-enforcing agencies' behaviour indicates a reprehensible attitude and lack of restraint.

However, one's main purpose in meeting the MQM chief was to elicit his views on the present political situation in urban Sindh and to find out what ideas he has about coping with the situation. Or how should everyone conduct himself, according to him. But that was what Mr. Altaf Hussain did not wish to expand on. One kept trying to assure him that the subject of law-enforcing agencies' behaviour is not the subject of my chief interest and that one did know the kind of thing they are doing, even if the precise facts and overall statistics are not known. What can and should now be done was the question. What lead was he giving now to his followers? To the end Mr. Altaf Hussain continued to refrain from formulating any positive response to these queries.

Let it be said that he is certainly bitter with all those with whom he has been aligned so far. That includes the army, the President, the PM [Prime Minister] and also the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. Of all of them, he seemed to have a softer corner for Mr. Gulam Ishaque Khan. He did not quite say so but that is one's impression. The MQM chief feels betrayed and jilted. But above all, he is

bewildered. In turn, one was bewildered at his political naivete. How could he be so surprised at being jilted by his political allies?

It also needs to be said that he used extremely restrained language about all these worthies. He used not one unparliamentary word or expressions. Although most of his complaints appeared to concern the army, he was careful not to say anything against the brass or even the army as an institution. He was bending over backwards to avoid saying anything harsh about any military leader. Perhaps he still harbours the vain hope of an understanding some day with them. He certainly wants to keep all his options open, though what options he is left with is hard to see. Although one was conscious that too much time was being devoted to detailing merely what was happening in Karachi and Hyderabad, two specific cases need to be mentioned because of the time he spent on them.

One was about the much-talked about incident of an army major and two others being 'arrested' by MQM workers in Landhi and who were beaten up. He gave a great many details of the circumstances, especially his own illness: He was under heavy sedation and was told only the next day about it, whereupon he contacted all the sundry, especially Jam Sadiq Ali. Ultimately the three men were handed over to the Sindh Police. They were not in uniform and were armed with Kalashnikovs which is not army's standard equipment. They were also in an unnumbered vehicle; there was no indication that they belonged to army or the vehicle did. It is still not clear to me why it was necessary to beat them up or even to 'arrest' them. Mr. Altaf Hussain did, however, explain that they were perceived to be participating in the internal struggle among the two MOM groups that were apparently having it out among themselves.

The second case that consumed a lot of time was the Sindh High Court case regarding Dr. Imran Farooq's relatives: the father, mother, brother, his lawyer and others. Mr. Altaf Hussain gave me a newspaper's clipping of the day before we were talking about, giving details of what happened. He gave a blow-by-blow account of what happened in the court and later when the law-enforcement agencies, including some Haqiqi persons, arrested the occupants of at least two cars while the third vehicle containing some relatives and friends of Imran Farooq 'escaped' the 'blockade'—only for a time though. They too were rounded up later.

Various details of the state of health of each of Mr. Farooq's relations was explained at length to me, as also the fact that despite court orders that these people should not be harassed and arrested again, they were promptly pounced upon by those who are meant to uphold rule of law. Until that late evening when one was talking to him, no one had any knowledge of the whereabouts of these people. They were obviously being kept as hostages for Imran Farooq. Mr. Altaf Hussain did make a telling

point about what kind of law is being enforced by the agencies concerned and what their concept of the rule of law is.

However, the sad fact has to be noted that Mr. Altaf Hussain's reluctance to talk about the political aspects of the current situation in (urban) Sindh was due to the fact that he saw no options open to him. He was also unable to offer any lead to his followers. This painful reality was all too clear. What he does say, instead, is that it is only for the intellectuals of the Mohajir community to come forward and give a lead. Perhaps he feels too shattered by the sufferings of his comrades and friends to be able to indicate any precise way out.

[21 Nov p 13]

[Text] He did insist on this writer giving his own assessment of the political situation facing the Urdu-speaking population of Sindh and what should they do. Despite my protests about representing nobody but oneself and being of no great consequence politically, his insistence on giving one's own assessment seemed to be the only opening.

Now, one's basic assessment of the situation is nothing obscure and one has, off and on, written on the subject in these columns.

I told him that despite all the complexities and bleakness of outlook, a few basic facts are obvious. They need to be kept in focus all the time, in the light of which current situation should be analysed. First, insofar as urban Sindh is concerned, the only man who still matters—despite all that the military has done in Karachi and Hyderabad—is Mr. Altaf Hussain who was the one who got all the votes cast for MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement]. MQM is still as relevant as it has substantially retained its popularity. It was for it to give a lead.

Secondly, in short order, one explained one's rather simple notions: Urdu-speaking part of Sindh is, first and foremost, a part of Sindh; these people are Sindhis albeit they speak Urdu. Their primary concern ought to be to befriend Sindhis. Without the friendship and cooperation of these two elements of Sindh society, neither community can expect to gain anything at all. The falling out between themselves merely enables the vested interests to manipulate and exploit Singh. It also poses a grave problem for the rest of the country.

The ultimate solution can only be through a peopleto-people rapprochement between the Urdu-speaking and Sindhi-speaking Sindhis and their united stand on various common issues can be the only guarantee that Sindh will be treated decently and that Pakistan can be preserved. And that is what will put all on the road to progress.

Mr. Altaf Hussain was quick to make the point that how can this unexceptionable idea be implemented now. One must make the confession that I have no blueprint of how the MQM and authentic representatives of Sindhi speaking Sindhis can begin a dialogue when the latter refuses to sit face to face with MQM leaders. But it is not a matter for only the MQM to implement or even to initiate the process; the process of reconciliation requires not merely a willingness of both sides to come together and cooperate but also to think of the ways of overcoming the misunderstandings and hurdles in the way. What is of primary importance is the need, in the here and now, to start such a dialogue.

Which again was the point where Mr. Altaf Hussain said that the precise issue was who to talk with and whether the other side was at all ready to talk with him or his men. Obvious divisions in the Sindhi ranks were also pointed out. I again offered the simple concept: just as on the Urdu-speaking side, the votes conferred on Altaf Hussain and the MQM (irrespective of subsequent military operation's achievements) a representative character, similarly it is possible to adjudge that the true representative of Sindhi opinion for longer rangepolitical purposes is PPP [Pakistan People's Party] whether or not Ms Benazir Bhutto is willing to talk with Altaf Hussain, or MQM. Not that other Sindhi schools of opinion are unimportant or should be ignored. Only a decisive political deal has to be made by those who got the most votes on either side and who remain likely to be large vote catchers.

I conceded the specific difficulty for the MQM to begin the dialogue because (a) the Muzaffar Hussain Shah group is in no position to deliver anything; and (b) PPP leadership's current perspective, incredibly, does not include any deal with such a notable component of Sindh's population as the so-called Mohajirs. The PPP seems to scent power independently of any corrective of the situation as it obtained before August 1990. This is strange but true.

One did say it was for the political representatives of the Urdu-speaking community to open the dialogue and it is for them to find out how to begin it. But, I also believe that, irrespective of the angularities or prejudices of this or that leader, the old Sindhis too have no option but to take the Urdu speakers into their confidence and willy nilly they will have to start a dialogue with them. Sooner they do the better it will be for them. And this goes for all schools of opinion among older Sindhis. There were various points Mr. Altaf Hussain made regarding PPP leadership and how they feel inhibited in doing a deal with Urdu-speaking community, not all of which I need mention here.

I must make plain one assumption involved here. The apparent official line—whether it has originated in the Government of Pakistan or in the GHQ [General Headquarters] I do not know or care—that Altaf Hussain and his more intimate companions' leadership can be eliminated by strong-arm tactics and the MQM utilised after bestowing upon it another leadership, or creating a brand new leadership from amongst the Mohajirs, is a zany notion. All said and done, the MQM did fulfil a

certain need at a given historical moment of the Urduspeaking part of Sindh. Fade away it will—but as a historical process when and if conditions are ripe for it. For state machinery to give an order to historical processes is a foolish exercise. Such attempts can only be counterproductive. They complicate matters and cannot solve any. They have already caused trauma among the Urdu-speaking sections. Without actually befriending and reconciliating the old Sindhis, they are alienating the Urdu-speakers also. History is not made this way. The MQM despite its obvious proclivities to violence and many condemnable activities, still has a role. How can it be enabled to do so is an urgent task of statesmanship—on the part of Administration, the PPP and other purely Sindhi groups and parties. For all its undoubted warts, MQM is still an unavoidable actor on the Sindhi stage.

Ishaq Khan Profiled, Reelection Plans Viewed

93AS0265A Lahore THE NATION (Supplement) in English 20 Nov 92 pp 1-2

[Article by M. A. Niazi: "Ishaq—The Pivot of Pakistan Politics"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] As Ghulam Ishaq Khan enters the final year of his Presidency, the general assumption is that he is already engaged in a subtle indirect campaign for a second term, and as in the past four years, though he remains very much a background figure, the limelight continues to glare on him.

Now 77 years old, he would be 78 if elected to a second term, and 83 when he ends it. At that point, he would have to quit the Presidency, because no more than two consecutive terms are allowed by the Constitution. However, despite his age, he is in such a fine physical shape that he might well be daring to go when next eligible, in 2003, at the age of 88, for another decade. It is perhaps no coincidence that when he was asked about his health, he mentioned another politician who ran for President at the age of 88.

There has been a definite change of attitude on his part, because as little as a year ago, insiders were insisting that the common assumption that he would contest in 1993 were misconceived, and Ishaq had made up his mind to go into retirement after nearly six decades of public service.

His has been one of the most distinguished public careers of the country, with his rise from a junior bureaucratic officer to the position of head of state being phenomenal, though not meteoric. The timespan is such that the rise has been solid and progressive, allowing the man to develop to fill the office, at no point disadvantaged by being an outsider or a newcomer. He had always been there a rung below.

In the process, he became the Ultimate Insider and the Ultimate Survivor. He can claim to have achieved the pinnacle of his career not once but four times, over the

last decade and a half. When he was appointed Secretary-General Defence by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he had reached as far as he had any reasonable hope of going as a government servant.

However, it was the Martial Law which made him, and brought him to the nation's attention. Zia made him his Finance Minister, and the annual budget ritual saw the nation having to sit through his grim-faced speeches in excrutiating Urdu seven times. After Martial Law was lifted, he retired to the Senate as its Chairman, another peak, and at the age of 70, his first electoral contest.

It was in 1988 that Ishaq's finest moment came, the grand climacteric of his career. The nation was now agog to listen to the strong Pushtu accent emanating from the same grim face, as he told them officially that President Ziaul Haq had died in a plane crash, and he had taken over as Acting President under the Constitution. In the end, Ishaq was no one's creature or creation, but that of fate and his own guts.

At a time of national crisis, when the apparently unshakeable military dictator had disappeared dramatically off the scene, those left behind in charge of the establishment found an appropriate father figure to turn to. Not only his age but his closeness to Zia and his vast experience as a bureaucrat, which included a stint at the Defence Ministry, enabled him to win the confidence of the military leaders of that time. It is not possible to underestimate the importance of the succession figure. One reason why the military was not willing to accept a constitutional succession in 1969, when Ayub Khan was forced out because of ill health, was that the constitutional successor was the National Assembly Speaker, an East Pakistani. Ishaq was very much plugged into the military-bureaucratic network that rules Pakistan, both as a veteran as well as through a couple of strategic marriages, notably that of his daughter with one of the powerful Saifullah clan.

Ishaq thus had three and a half months as head of both government and state, until he held the elections in 1988. Famous even among bureaucrats as a stickler for the rules, he conducted a pretty fair election, introducing the judiciary into the process, and making ID cards compulsory for voting.

Though perceived at the time as a relatively neutral personality in the confused politics of the country, a hint of his leanings, and that of the Army as represented by COAS [Chief of Army Staff] Gen Aslam Beg, when they delayed until the last possible moment before Ishaq made the inevitable nomination of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister, hanging on until Mian Nawaz Sharif, the only but most junior frontrank JI [Jamaat-i-Islami] leader to win a National Assembly seat, first tried to stitch together a coalition at the centre, and then consolidated his hold on the Punjab.

This was not common knowledge at the time, but Ishaq definitely did all that was legally possible to avoid a PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government. He then found

himself in a position where there was no other serious contender for the Presidency. As part of the deal, playing a rather weak hand, Ishaq managed to obtain the endorsement of both the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] and the PPP for the presidential election that came up. Luckily, he caught the PPP in a rather desperate mood, in which it also 'borrowed' Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, for the Foreign Minister's slot.

Ishaq has never been very vocal about his views. He was one of Bhutto's inner circle towards the end, but he became a true believer in the Zia worldview while serving him for 11 years. When he succeeded him, he was forced to allow the PPP into power. Initially, he had hopes that the PPP would fit into the mould that the establishment wanted. However, that did not happen, and Benazir Bhutto engaged on a series of challenges that offended most of the establishment. In almost each case, the President was involved.

Ishaq probably took a biased view of the initial Centre-Punjab clashes, but was never directly brought in, and though the appointments of senior bureaucrats needed his signature, the matter was settled before the matter was put up to him. However, the Sirohey affair proved the first direct challenge to his Presidential prerogative. The Benazir government attempted to retire. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Admiral Iftikhar Sirohey on the ground that he had completed three years in the rank of Admiral, even though his tenure still had over two years to run.

The President reacted publicly, issuing a blunt press statement that the Admiral was to retire on the completion of three years as Chairman, irrespective of how long he had spent in his rank. The President, safeguarding his discretionary power of appointment, added that as the competent appointing authority, he was also the competent retiring authority. It was a strange affair, but the results for the Benazir government were adverse, for it alienated an already suspicious military, and in particular, it converted the Dartmouth-trained Sirohey, pained by being dragged into the public gaze, from an upholder of the principle that an elected government had the right to be obeyed, into a virulent opponent of the PPP government. His influence weighed heavily in the counsels of the military later.

The COP [Combined Opposition Parties] was formed, though Ishaq apparently had little to do with it. While maintaining his distance from the Opposition in public, he was always available to Opposition leaders who wished to call on him. He also did not play a high-profile role in the no-confidence move against Benazir Bhutto, but 1990 proved a turning point, again because of 'offences' against his prerogative.

There were two related issues which disturbed him: the first was the appointment of the new Chief Justice of Pakistan upon the retirement of Chief Justice Muhammad Haleem. The controversy occurred because Benazir violated the convention of appointing the moat

senior judge to the post. Ishaq, who felt that the convention should be maintained, refused to sign, resting upon the constitutional provision introduced by Zia that such appointments were made by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice. Once again, Benazir had to back down, but not without having irreparably offended the two judges she wished to supersede, as well as Ishaq.

The campaign, of which nothing came, to hold a fresh presidential election in March 1990 on the ground that Ishaq had been elected to the remainder of Zia's term rather than a full term in his own right, did nothing to improve Ishaq's opinion of the PPP. It just became a matter of biding his time by then.

Like a true bureaucrat, Ishaq had engaged in writing letters to the government, criticising various actions and questioning various decisions. The file grew thicker as time passed, until the moment came when Ishaq felt the time was ripe. The military was also concerned about the situation in Sindh. One of the consolations of the PPP rule had been that the chronic strife in the province would now taper off. However, it did not happen that way. When the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] left the coalition in Sindh, the situation degenerated in the urban areas as well. The Pucca Qila operation was an important flashpoint, but the PPP government was duly allowed to pass a budget and see Muharram through. This was typical bureaucratic reasoning: the last dissolution had come before the year's budget had been passed. leading to needless complications after the elections, while Muharram had significant law and order implications.

The President then sacked the PPP government just as his predecessor had sacked the PML [Pakistan Muslim League] government. He fulfilled his promise to hold elections on the prescribed date, but while the elections might have been free, they were not fair. The combination of official media and development funds, apart from other political manoeuvres, gave what proved an unbeatable edge to the IJI. The President saw no evil in the actions of Mustafa Jatoi's caretaker administration.

His chargesheet against the PPP was carefully drafted, to ensure that a court could uphold the decision he made, and the references he made were meant to buttress them. However, the fate of the references, as they drag on, shows that they were not really meant as a serious attempt of accountability. The President remained aloof from the election campaign, though his final address to the nation before the election proved a tigerish speech for the prosecution.

The next phase was the induction of Mian Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. Ishaq also ensured that his sonsin-law were strategically placed: Senator Anwar Saifullah was inducted into the Federal Cabinet as a full Minister following after an embarrassing delay after an initial attempt to make him a mere Minister of State, while Irfanullah Marwat won notoriety as Jam Sadiq Ali's all-powerful unelected Home Adviser.

The year saw a decline of the President's personal influence and of the Zia legacy. Roedad Khan was sidelined as PM's [Prime Minister] Adviser, while Ijlal Haider Zaidi was pressured into resigning over the Lahore runway issue. Sahibzada Yaqub was left to retire as Foreign Minister. However, most important was the changeover in the armed forces.

There was a changeover in all three services as well as at Joint Service Headquarters.

Ishaq's first appointments, in 1988, had been of the most senior officers in every case, with Beg and Sirohey virtually selecting themselves. In 1991, Ishaq showed his penchant for the bureaucratic Buggins' Turn. Political exigencies made it necessary to designate the COAS earlier than usual, which led in turn to the unusual appointment of Gen Shamim Alam Khan to the post of Chairman-designate of the JCSC [Joint Chief of Staff Committee]. These two appointments led to a certain shift in emphasis at GHQ [General Headquarters], and much of the bias against the PPP dissipated. It remains in general, but it is not as virulent.

The PM also seemed to be making the sort of overtures that seemed a deviation from the Zia legacy, and the result was the President changing his mind about retirement. The PDA's heckling of him during the last joint sitting, as well as the emphasis that has been laid on the President up to the PDA's Independence Day rally in its campaigning, also did not endear them to him.

However, even though his motivation, or at least self-justification, in attempting another run at the Presidency is to protect the country from the PPP, he has apparently managed to convey to them an impression that he is willing to dicker. This is a development after the Sindh Operation, where the Army's crackdown on the MQM placed his son-in-law under a cloud and besmirched his own image, when the PM and the President at one point seemed to be converging on a removal of the COAS.

Since then, Ishaq has played it very coolly. He has pointedly withdrawn the apparently unqualified support he once afforded Mian Nawaz. He is no longer for PDA's Enemy Number One. He is still in a position where he was needed to broker the deal on Sindh between the Army and the government. And no one knows what exactly he has in mind.

However, Ishaq, though physically in the best of health, has no one to confide in left, really. His contemporaries are mostly dead, while even his proteges, the Deputy Secretaries who worked with him when he was a Secretary, have now started retiring. The main political leaders of the country are both half his age, and his problems with Benazir and Mian Nawaz, vastly different in degree though they may have been, are at least partly because of a generation gap. Therein lies part of the

reason why the nation's politics are revolving around an almost-octogenarian who enjoys good health.

Sharif Leadership Seen Inept, Corrupt 93AS0205A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 14 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Prometheus: "Two Years of Nawaz"]

[Text] The political horizon today is clouded by ominous rumours of all sorts. The State of Denmark is rotten and stinking with intrigue. All sorts of speculations are rife and involve almost every important person who matters right from the top, from the president to the stalwarts of PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], NDA [National Democratic Alliance] and the MNAs [Member of National Assembly] and senators supporting Junejo, the former prime minister and the head of Muslim League. This is in fact the culmination of the instability that has characterised our politics for the last seven years in general and the present regime in particular.

Mian Sahib has yet to complete his tenure. He has ostensibly close to a two thirds majority in the House. He is given to making strong statements and he claims to be in firm control of the situation. Yet the air is thick with uncertainty. Why?

After two years of ruling this country, this is how his government is plagued. And that speaks volumes about the quality of his leadership.

Mian Sahib started his tenure with tall claims to bring a new era of liberalisation of economy. Indeed he initiated very firmly a process of deregulation and privatisation, the concepts which Benazir also supported but with reluctance and caution. But Mian Sahib appeared determined.

Yet he took a simplistic view of the economic reforms he so strongly advocated. He did not realise that more than any techno economic measure the economy needed a clean and stable political environment. And he was therefore unable to create that with these twin characteristics. He failed to grasp the fact that uncertainty was poison for economy and in its presence no worth while achievement could be made, no matter how strong the dose of privatisation and deregulation he might administer.

Temperamentally, Mian Sahib never showed a strong aversion to corruption. As a consequence his policies raised unpleasant controversies. The way he went about privatisation created the impression that instead of creating a market economy based on the principles of competition, he was trying to develop monopolies of a few business houses, personally loyal to him. The charges of corruption were openly aired. The media splashed all sorts of stories of financial scandals of such large proportions that the corruption charges against Benazir's government looked frivolous. But that is not the only area of scandal that afflicted his administration. The coop

scandal tarnished his personal image and that of a number of IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] stalwarts. Ridden with scandals, the economy could not achieve the breakthrough he was all the time talking about. He also did not take certain steps pre-requisite to bring the twin deficits down to reasonable levels. His government on the contrary acquired a reputation of fiscal irresponsibility. He was hardly austere. By announcing a huge cabinet he only revealed his weakness as a leader of the parliamentary group in power. It also rendered him ineffective in curtailing the current expenditure of the government. To cut down the expenditures he had to curtail the number of ministries and divisions, but his large cabinet needed large empires for various ministers. The fiscal deficit kept rising and is going to be close to 100 billion in the end of the current fiscal year. Inflation is beyond the ability of this government to control. So is the case of unemployment.

The deteriorating law and order situation too appeared to be beyond his ability to manage. One major reason of his failure in this field was his inability to take a bipartisan view of the law and order management. His fervent partisan use of administration has rendered the crime management entirely unsuccessful. That he does not seem to appreciate. A crime ridden economy is constantly in a state of uncertainty. Abduction for ransom, daylight robberies, gang rapes and politically motivated violence has thrown the entire economic progress to a state of chaos and lawlessness. In such a situation no foreign investor is willing to invest in this country. Even the local entrepreneur are unwilling to risk their capital in projects of longer gestation.

Being primarily a man of the establishment he did not develop his priorities right. He had moved up the ladder in political power structure through playing the cards of the anti-PPP [Pakistan People's Party] establishment. He did not realise that to develop a strong political base he needed a different strategy after becoming the prime minister. The root cause of instability in the political economy of this country was Eighth Amendment. And to strike that down from the constitution was a necessary to eliminate structural instability developed by Gen Zia into the system. He therefore could not consolidate his position. He did not act in that direction in a systematic manner and instead of mobilising support to restore the legitimate authority of the parliament, he chose a policy of belligerence towards his opposition. In the process he not only bitterly alienated the opposition which was initially willing to offer its support to him, he also strengthened the hands of those forces which were inimical to the consolidation of the power of the prime minister. He was naturally inhibited by cracks in the alliance that he was heading. As a leader he failed to develop within his own political alliance a consensus to treat opposition with the grade and decency it deserved in a parliamentary system.

As a leader he failed to undo the damaging process of accountability that the president had initiated against his opposition. As a chief executive he was unable to tame those hawks within the cabinet who were interested to eliminate PPP and supported the draconian measures that Jam Sahib took in Sindh with the blessing of the president. He headed an alliance of various heterogeneous groups, unable to stay together.

With a bitterly hostile opposition, with the widening cracks in the alliance he headed as a leader and with strong dissenters within his own cabinet, the prime minister became weaker and weaker and was more and more dependent upon the president. Given the atmosphere of intrigue that the existing dyarchical relations produce within the federation, the prime minister failed to develop a perfectly smooth relationship with the president as well. A haphazard attempt was also made by him to take away a chunk of the powers of the president through the 12th Amendment, a move that was successfully thwarted by the president. Yet the damage had been done and serious doubts were created in president's circles regarding the loyalty of the prime minister with the president. The relationship therefore have had its ups and downs keeping both of them at tenterhooks. Thirdly as a leader he was never able to develop political clout in the three provinces outside Punjab. That further weakened his position as a head of federal government and made him more and more vulnerable. In that sense he allowed himself to be seen as a limited leader. That limitation also betrayed his weakness despite the ostensible strength of numbers he enjoyed in the house.

As a politician he showed limited understanding of events. He is a great master of damage control but only knows how to react to the events. He cannot take a long-term view and does not seem to anticipate the current. He functions on day to day basis. That is why no one is sure if the next day would dawn with he being in power. That again is intensifying the uncertainty so lethal to his solitary programme of economic reforms about whose benefits he so much claims in public.

Army Role in Sindh Proclaimed Highly Successful 93AS0186C Lahore THE NATION in English 12 Nov 92 p 10

[Article by Ikram Sehgal: "Operation Clean-Up: First Term Review"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The Pakistan Army was mandated by the PM [Prime Minister] in May 1992, on the "advise" of the Sindh government, to restore the rule of law in the Province of Sindh, for which a six-month period was given. In actual implementation political considerations effectively circumscribed the Army's actions in controlling the criminal activity that was rampant in the Province while ignoring the prime raison d'etre for that activity. It was administratively expedient to have the Army support the tottering Sindh government by propping up the civil administration, but the evenhandedness that the Army proposed went against the grain of the Sindh government. The present incumbents only wanted the Army to rid the Province of their

political enemies (and problematical friends) while they went about their business of distributing favours, plots, etc.

Having launched the Army into the void, all the other power centres conveniently faded out of the picture, including the government controlled media, particularly PTV [Pakistan Television]. The Army soon became rudely aware that it was left to accomplish its mission on its own while holding its credibility together as best it could. Necessary support from the other organs of the State was unavailable. The situation seems to have been deliberately engineered on the one hand to (1) cow down the Opposition (and recalcitrants among vocal friendlies such as the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement]) by the sheer might of the Army's force and on the other to (2) emasculate the Army's potential as an accountability monitor by getting embroiled in a no-win situation. In normal parlance, this is known as the "two birds with one stone" ploy.

The urban area operations in Karachi will be recorded as one of Pakistan Army's finest hours, not so much in what they could have accomplished (given a freer hand) but in exercising restraint and not doing what they could have done in the face of inflammatory rhetoric that acted as a grave provocation. A part of the MQM had become wholly militant and even criminally motivated, out of control of the MQM hierarchy (or even with their fearful consent). Commensurate immaturity on the part of the military leadership would have meant national disaster. Foremost in their minds were the lessons learnt from Operation Blue Star, the Indian Army's storming of the Sikh's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple. The immediate bloody solution created multi-fold, long-term, insoluble problems. As such the Army strictly followed the teaching of Sun Tzu, "far better to win a battle without bloodying swords." Whether exercising maturity or discretion (as the better part of valour) the militants did not physically oppose the Army and all immediate objectives were secured without firing a single shot. Given the sorry history of the subcontinent and adjacent regions in this respect, this remarkable fire control must be some sort of a record in establishing the rule of law in an urban area. Six months later that milestone remains intact, a far cry from the modus operandi (and the subsequent disaster) in East Pakistan.

This new found military sophistication could only be possible because of a more confident, better educated and self-effacing leadership. Turning the disaster of the Tando Bahawal incident into an advantage, the COAS [Chief of Army Staff] moved swiftly to make it an exercise of accountability by removing the GOC [General Officer Commanding] involved as well as his concerned Brigade Commanders. This acted like a tonic, all ranks down the line taking that as a major indicator the COAS meant business. It also inspired credibility visa-vis the Army's action among the masses. All senior officers except for the Corps Commander (he hardly has a choice) have strictly avoided social contact. Their non-involvement with local citizens has minimised

normal accusations of bias. By concentrating on the task at hand, Task Force Karachi has been able to score impressive gains in the pure statistics of urban crime, car snatchings/liftings, down from a maximum of 30-40 a day to an average of 3-4 a day, kidnappings down from half a dozen a day to one maybe in a month or so, and so on. As the Army has acted to curb crime, their frustration level has increased because the source of most of the problems has been revealed a mixture of administrative weakness, inefficiency and corruption. In a city of maybe 9-11 million people, there are only 15 magistrates to handle day-to-day urban problems. Most of them remain absent or sick. Out of the crimes committed, the police have managed to solve only 8 percent; out of those arrested, 80 percent have been granted bail, mostly on sureties which have been found fake afterwards. Almost incapable of solving crimes, the police in many cases had perpetrated them at the behest of their administrative and political masters or had gone into business on their own. Car snatchings were mostly police-assisted or condoned. Those cars recovered were disposed of in a Supardari racket in which even the close administrative aides of the CM [Chief Minister] are known to have been involved (over 250 have been recovered from the Supardaris). As the Army probed deeper into crimes they kept coming to a recurring and horrifying conclusion: those responsible for most crimes occupied key positions within the Sindh government machinery, most criminals were harboured and supported by them.

The Army's targets, among others, were (and are) those MQM activists believed to have become rogue. Those sought for cleverly exploited the opportunity and gave a wrong perception that the targets included the whole MOM hierarchy and thus, by extension, the Mohajir Community. This canard was egged on by the criminal elements within the Sindh government machinery. As much as the Tando Bahawal incident was a horrifying episode, the outrageous Jinnahpur question became a media liability which the un-Godly exploited to the hilt. MQM dissidents, the Haqeeqi-types, were used as a Trojan Horse by the Army to secure their immediate objectives without blood-shed and they were dropped almost immediately like hot potatoes. But it did undercut the Army's credibility with the public at large as these gentlemen were of the type that the Army was supposed to neutralise. It did set off an unfortunate misconception of sorts among the Mohajir Community in general about the Army's intentions. The MQM hierarchy had jumped the gun by going underground. Now they have to find a face-saving gesture to come out of the cold and resume the genuine leadership of their electorate so that the continuing vacuum is not exploited by adventurers and self-seekers. Task Force Karachi has moved in a deliberate phase-wise manner but there has been method in their seeming madness.

In the rural areas, the Army's success has been more clear-cut because the tactical missions were well defined. The targets were the countrywide dacoits and more identifiable. There always remained a semblance of law

and order in the urban areas; in contrast there was complete breakdown thereof in the Sindh interior and so the results have been immediate and spectacular. Hardbitten dacoits who did not heed discretion and head for safer pastures have been hunted down relentlessly. In the process, the Army may have suffered casualties (the office-men ratio being extremely high is an indication of the best army tradition of its younger leaders leading from the front) but has inflicted lasting damage to the dacoit system that operated on civil and police connivance with the local wadera and thus ran a State within a State. The whole countryside had fallen into their evil hands and the populace endelessly terrorised. Most of the hard-core criminals may have escaped because of the lack of surprise and help of their patrons but as they are getting caught and giving confessional statements, their involvement with known political figures, high ranking civil and police officials, etc., are increasingly coming to light. A DIG [Deputy Inspector General] Police went to the extent of paying homage at the crowning of the "King" of dacoits, a horrifying commentary to what depths responsible officials in Sindh had descended and why they, along with their political mentors, considered themselves Untouchables. A comprehensive list has been prepared by the Army based on verifiable evidence. It has such political luminaries in it that the Provincial government may well collapse. A distorted version of the sacred list of Untouchables has appeared in the media, obviously to undercut the credibility of the actual list and to create a pre-emptive hue and cry. The backbone of the dacoits has hardly been broken. The principle of upholding the rule of law demands that the Army faces up to its convictions in the national interest and does not spare anyone. No individual is above the law, whatever his status or influence. Unless the Untouchables are brought to justice, the situation will slide back to the same state of virtual lawlessness. This action can only add to the major national gains already made, in as far that ethnic Sindhis have regained their trust in the impartiality of the Army and welcomed them with open arms. Ask the common villager whether he now sleeps easy or in dread; forget the rhetoric inside the Assemblies. This has been a major development in the reintegration of the estranged Sindhi community back into the Pakistani mainstream.

The Army's report card in Sindh for the First Term is well above average. It could have been outstanding if the other power centres had cooperated but then some of them in Sindh, including the police, are themselves part of the problem. The COAS asked the Federal government recently that the Army be relieved of its responsibilities in Sindh having accomplished the narrowly defined mission given within the restricted parameters. The COAS may also have been concerned about exposing the Army's rank and file to extended periods of Internal Security (IS) duties. Prolonged exposure to wordly temptations has overcome uniformed personnel before; it also cuts into their operational effectiveness. The COAS has emphasised that IS duties should be gradually taken over by the Rangers and the freshly

recruited police forces. The COAS' concerns notwithstanding, the integrity of the country remains in danger from within and the Federal government did well in extending the period for three months, even that is too little a time given the enormity of the task involved.

As the Army delves deeper into the mess created by years of administrative malfeasance and involvement in major crimes, the Federal government may well have to look for drastic solutions to stabilise the rule of law in Sindh. There are no quick fixes. One suggestion would be to impose Governor's rule in the Province for a three-year period. At the moment Mr. Muzzaffar Hussain Shah is propped up artificially. The Pakistan Army has done an excellent job in the prevailing circumstances but it does not have the means of bringing in the socio-economic and administrative reforms that are needed to strengthen the bedrock of society and thus maintain the credibility of the rule of law. The measured actions of Operation Clean-Up speak extremely well of the Army and has shown that some institutions continue to survive as islands of credibility in Pakistan.

JI Leader Interviewed on Sharif, Martial Law Possibility

93AS0268A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 20 Nov 92 pp 14-15

[Interview with Chaudhry Rahmat Illahi, Leader of Pakistan's Jamaat-I-Islami by Shahid Sheikh in Hyderabad; date not given]

[Text] Chaudhry Rahmat Illahi, deputy leader [sic] of Jamaat-i-Islami [JI] of Pakistan recently came to Hyderabad from Lahore. In our interview with him, we questioned him on current affairs:

[Sheikh] In your view, what is the most important problem facing the country today?

[Illahi] I consider the problem of leadership the most important issue facing the country. It was leadership that reduced the country to its present deplorable state so that we have fallen behind both economically and morally. This leadership is confined to only one class, educated by the British and faithful to them; this class has usurped the country for a long time; the problems of the country will not be solved unless this leadership is changed.

[Sheikh] By leadership, are you referring to the present ruling class only or to other classes as well?

[Illahi] I am not referring to any particular individual but to the entire team that runs the country; thus, [the term leadership] includes not only the ruling group but those other groups as well that have come into office at various times.

[Sheikh] In regard to the present government to which you refer, was not Jamaat-i-Islami involved in the efforts to bring the government into office and thus create the present situation?

[Illahi] You are probably referring to the Ittehad; Islami Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI] was formed in 1988 and it was the first time that an alliance in which we participated came into office. We had joined other alliances earlier; but the public mandate that IJI received had never before been gained by any other alliance. The present government was put in office because the country was in a very bad situation. We thought that if the alliance was not created, the country's situation would deteriorate even further and we were proved right. If the alliance had not been formed, the country would have faced many problems. Furthermore, we did not have any illusions about the group with which we had formed an alliance; we did try, however, to prepare a manifesto that would allow the promulgation of Islam and justice. By bringing the government into office, we did succeed in saving the country from a crisis, but the government has disappointed us continuously in regard to Islamization, and it has failed to carry out its promises. That was the reason why we separated from IJI.

[Sheikh] The present government has appealed to the Supreme Court against the Shari'ah Court's decision that interest was against Islamic law. Can one not consider this action by the government an open declaration of war against God and His prophet?

[Illahi] The charging of interest has been forbidden by the Koran; the nation has always been in agreement over the fact that interest is against Islamic law. The Koran and Sunna [tradition] both agree on this matter. Charging interest is forbidden not only in dealings between individuals but the law applies to social and state affairs as well. In the verses referring to interest in the Koran, these two kinds of dealings are also included. The Koran says as well that those who continue to charge interest are at war against God and His prophet; thus whatever measures are taken [by the government] will be included under this category. Although they may not appear to be fighting against God and prophet, they will face the truth in the other world.

The judgment of the Federal Shari'ah Court regarding interest is absolutely right. The government says that it is appealing the decision; but an appeal should be made only if there is any doubt about the decision. Declaring interest illegal is an unequivocal decision; it is illogical to appeal against it. I am sure that the government's appeal will prove to be bad judgment on its part and the Supreme Court will rule in favor of the Shari'ah Court. But I consider the government's appeal itself a contravention of the Shari'ah.

[Sheikh] In its appeal, the government has maintained that the Federal Shari'ah Court did not hear the views of all groups and classes nor did it offer an alternative to the present economic system; that the promulgation of the Shari'ah Court's decision would destroy the country's economic system.

[Illahi] It is not true that the Shari'ah Court did not hear other views; it ended ongoing arguments over the issue.

In regard to the argument that the court may not have decided as it did if it had heard the views of other experts, my question is, did the government present any experts whose views the Shari'ah Court refused to hear?

Regarding proposing alternative systems, it is the government's and not the court's responsibility to make such suggestions. When a court makes a decision, is it not possible for the government to offer alternatives? The fact is that all these actions are aimed at deceiving the people. The court only takes into account those actions that are against the laws laid down by the Koran and Sunna and passes judgment accordingly. Alternative systems can be proposed only by a government that is afraid of declaring war against God and the prophet and keeps in mind the day of judgment and realizes that it will have to account for its actions. A government that cares for none of these things does not see any necessity to do anything in that regard. In regard to alternative systems, at present there are about 60 banks that do not charge interest and that have branches in Western, Asian and other countries. The Government of Pakistan may find it difficult to promulgate a noninterest system but these difficulties will gradually be solved. To maintain that there are no alternatives is an attempt to mislead the people.

As for the attempts to present our international debts and agreements as major obstacles [in the promulgation of a noninterest system], recently the World Bank told the Government of Pakistan that if it wished to adopt a system based on no-interest, the Bank was ready to discuss the matter. The Government of Pakistan's answer was that no such discussion was necessary. The fact is that the government's intentions are dishonest; it does not plan to promulgate an Islamic economic system.

[Sheikh] The government has bowed to the demands of religious parties that religion be included in the identity cards but the government is dillydallying on the matter. On the other hand, the People's Party and minorities are condeming the measure. I would like to ask you two question; why was it considered necessary to include religion [in the identity] cards and why are the opponents of this measure opposing it?

[Illahi] It was thought necessary to include religion in the identity cards because the Qadiyanis, who, after a great deal of effort by the Muslims, were finally declared a non-Muslim minority, were taking illegal advantage of the identity cards. The Qadiyanis do not accept the court's decision and insist upon calling themselves Muslims. Those Muslims who engaged in a struggle against them demanded that a separate column be added for Qadiyanis in the identity cards. But as a matter of principle, a separate column cannot be added just for one religious group; the regulation would have to apply to everyone. Except for the Qadiyanis, other religious groups do not hide their identity and they should not oppose the measure. Regarding opposition to the measure by other groups, there is only one group in this

country that does not want Islamic law applied to affairs of state, which wants to make Pakistan an irreligious and secular state; the group is a small one but it has gained importance because of its influence within the government and outside it. The group wants religion to be an individual's private affair to be kept between him and his deity; they do not want Islam applied to law and justice, the economy and education and in the halls of presidency. Thus, this group's opposition in fact denotes a struggle between Islam and secularism. This secular group controls the press especially the English-language press and has the same influence in the government. It uses Christians [as tools]; but our Christian brothers should in fact ask themselves: how does adding a column on religion in the identity cards affect any of their rights. Have any of their rights suffered in the past? Why should they now assume that the measure would harm their rights? It is not right to oppose a matter on the basis of mere assumptions and conjectures.

[Sheikh] Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the People's Party, has decided to start an agitation against the government and as the first stage of the process, has declared a kill-or-be-killed-but-remove-the-government-long-march. Can such a decision be called democratic?

[Illahi] Although the government has gone back on its promises and we consider it a failed government, nevertheless we believe that the government that will come into office as a result of the long march will be much worse. We have seen what they [People's Party] did in the past, that is why we are not interested in this long march. The agitation and long march may bring back martial law which is an unpleasant prospect; since we do not have an alternative at hand for the present government, we are opposed to the long march. We believe that the imposition of martial law will be harmful for the country and will bring democratic process to an end.

[Sheikh] What is your opinion regarding the present government's performance over the last two years?

[Illahi] The present ruling authorities have failed to bring about any real change. It is because of Operation Clean-Up that peace has been restored to a certain extent in Sindh; but it has not achieved a permanent solution of the province's problem. As regards the economy, the cost of living and loans have increased and no improvement is in sight. There has been a deterioration in morality and Islamization has been halted. In regard to other important issues, such as Kashmir's jihad, Afghanistan, nuclear energy, and Palestine, the government has bowed to U.S. pressure. As we survey the situation, we find that the government's performance over the last two years in all fields and issues important to the country and the nation has been disappointing.

[Sheikh] What course of action does JI intend to adopt in order to save the nation from this disappointing state of affairs?

[Illahi] In view of the fact that both the government and the opposition have failed miserably to provide a sincere, fearless, moral and efficient leadership, after considerable thought and experience, JI has reached the conclusion that it should offer the nation a new and efficient leadership. The people have tested both the government and the opposition; hence, we have started work on a number of plans and by the Grace of God, we will soon succeed in offering the nation good leadership.

[Sheikh] What practicable programs have you drawn up?

[Illahi] A great deal depends on the [?people]. Several plans are being considered and a practicable program will soon be drawn up.

Intent, Implications of PPP Long March Examined

Consensus on Needed Changes

93AS0206A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 15 Nov 92 pp 10-11

[Article by Ahmad Bashir: "Yes, There Is Hope"; italicized words as published]

[Text] I am dismayed over PDA's [People's Democratic Alliance] agitation for the overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif government, because this one-point programme is not a political agenda. The people who were to be brought on the street had nothing to get out of it in the absence of a socio-economic programme.

The National Democratic Alliance [NDA] and the Islamic Democratic Front [IDF], who were opposed to the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government and were working for the installation of a government of national consensus, were elusive. The PDA continues to be a party in the IJI's Balochistan coalition. It wants to oust the president too.

The NDA of Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan has a more practical vision and has made only Mian Nawaz Sharif their target. They are building public pressure and trying to persuade the president to dismiss the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif.

The president does not appear to be in a mood to oblige. But there is always an element of conspiracy in our political struggles at the top, and whatever might seem improbable today, may become possible tomorrow. The president has been challenging the opposition to bring a no-confidence motion in the National Assembly if they want the government of the IJI overthrown. The signs are not helpful.

But the situation may develop in the coming weeks. Both the PDA and the NDA (which wants to convert itself into a political party) have come out with their political manifestos. Both aim at bringing about changes in the system distorted by General Ziaul Haq. The PDA wants restoration of the social contract of 1973 for a starting point, and there is wisdom in it, because it will not be possible to draft an altogether new constitution. Amendments can be made in the original. The NDA, too, wants the old constitution amended.

It is also being suggested that the PDA may quit the Balochistan coalition which will make it possible for the PDA and the NDA to forge a united front against the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif. Massive pressure can be brought against it, but will that force the Nawaz government to resign? Perhaps, the president can then be persuaded to sack it. Perhaps, not. Because though the president has said that he has not yet decided to go for another term, his statement that people at the age of 88 (an apparent reference to the Chinese) are in the saddle, suggests that he will not quit, at least, until he is 88.

If that is what he wants, then he will have to be assured that the government of national consensus will support his election, if the IJI government is dismissed. Both the NDA and PDA want a new president, and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan is in the run as a candidate. That makes a deal with Ghulam Ishaq Khan difficult. So, where do we go from here? Nobody really knows. Unknown factors can play their part. The American elections could contribute to the development of a situation, in which the fundamentalist lobby of the IJI is given short shrift.

The army could be a factor in the change of government, because it has been betrayed in Sindh, and it has no interest in the maintenance of the status quo. The administration could collapse on account of the upsurge of the people, if the opposition succeeds in forging a united front and the programme of basic changes envisioned in the manifestos of the PDA and the NDA are effectively publicised.

No party has ever implemented its manifesto. All of them have ended up with minor reforms. Now is the time for a change and the people are for once made to believe that change in government will mean change in the quality of their life, they will be ready to die for the cause. All depends on how the PDA and NDA launch their agitation. Will they be content with high-profile oratory or will they spell out their programmes with logic and reason?

The NDA passed a resolution on the national situation under Mian Nawaz Sharif's government and said that he had miserably failed to improve the law and order situation; he has failed to protect the life, property, and honour of the people; his policies have aggravated the miseries of the common man; he has mounted a campaign of vilification and victimisation against political opponents; he is harassing, intimidating, and arresting political workers; he is terrorising and victimising the independent press; he is destroying political institutions and making a mockery of democracy; he has shattered people's trust in the electoral process, etc. etc.

The NDA was of the opinion that the efforts and the energies of the government were addressed to promote and protect the personal, family and group interest of its

high and low functionaries. The stay of the armed forces in Sindh has been extended to maintain the incompetent minority government of Muzaffar Shah and perform police duties for him.

Most districts of the Punjab were under police jackboots who are, instead of dealing with crime, trying to harass the opposition. In Balochistan, ministers of government are patronising crime. The media have been reduced to an instrument of government propaganda. The industrial economy has been ruined. Investment is shy. In the name of privatisation, the nation is being dispossessed of its assets to enrich the families and the friends of the ruling elite. The agricultural economy has also been ruined. Farmers are switching over to crops other than cotton with the result that Pakistan would lose its foreign exchange earning capacity.

The Nawaz Sharif government is obediently carrying out orders of the IMF and the World Bank. In foreign policy, it has bungled. Its failure in Kashmir is deplorable. The Indian record of human rights in the valley is unbearable, but the IJI government has failed to inform the world. Its Afghanistan policy was unproductive. In Central Asia, it has made no progress. And now they are playing with the idea of the recognition of Israel. In this backdrop, the NDA has come out with a political manifesto.

Both manifestos are progressive, liberal, even radical, in their purposes. The PDA has called its manifesto a pledge to the nation, which could become the basis of an election manifesto. Its salient points include:

- Expansion of assemblies, central as well as provincial, in view of increase in population;
- -Provision of adult franchise in Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA];
- -Reduction of election expenditures;
- —More autonomy for the province with decentralisation of powers, to enable elected representatives of the people to exercise more power at the local level;
- Open enquiry into misappropriation of public funds by public figures and private financial institutions including the cooperatives;
- —Declaration of assets by public officers every year;
- —Handing over development work to viable community-based organisations and nation-building departments in rural as well as urban areas;
- —The elimination of sectarianism with guaranteed equal rights for all citizens without reference to their caste, creed, religion and sex. Repressive and coercive laws against women will be repealed;
- -Abolition of the system of separate electorates;
- —Judiciary will be separated from the executive and special courts will be abolished. The Frontier Crimes

Regulations will also be abolished and writ of the superior courts will run in FATA as well. As a general principle, prisoners who have been on trial for more than six months will be released on bail;

- —Large public works programmes will be launched to give jobs to all kinds of workers. Health, education, road building irrigation, water supply, soil conservation and reclamation of water-logged and saline lands, will get special attention;
- —Prices of drugs will be reduced, and monopolies eliminated. A system of barefoot doctors will be introduced by training intermediate students from local communities in basic health care;
- -Elimination of the drug problem;
- —Budget for education will be doubled and education would be made more relevant. Mother tongue will be medium of instruction at the primary level;
- —Establishment of a special commission to review the entire process of privatisation. The PDA stands for handing over the nationalised industries to the private sector on a selective basis. The exercise will be transparent;
- -Industrialisation of the under-developed areas;
- —The press will be free and all enquiries will be made public.

Manifesto of the NDA is also good and testifies to the alliances sense of realism. It demands the removal of the IJI government and expects the president to dismiss it. It has, therefore, decided not to target the president. Many unknown factors could be at play.

The convention of the NDA demanded that a national government should be installed to hold free and fair elections. The manifesto, as drafted, did not concern itself with *riba* and the supremacy of the Quran and the Sunnah. This clause was added during the convention. It could become an insurmountable impediment for their programme. A consensus on the quantum of provincial autonomy was difficult to achieve. But there was agreement on the curtailment of the defence budget, and on the repeal of the 8th and 12th Amendments.

The convention decided that minorities be given equal rights, and voted for the withdrawal of the decision to add a religion column to the national identity cards. It was also decided to separate the judiciary from the executive. The president was asked to dissolve the assemblies.

According to the manifesto, the NDA shall strive to strengthen the federal parliamentary system, harvesting national resources for the welfare of the people, the federation should be given the subjects of defence, external affairs, federal taxation, currency, communications, nationality and citizenship, nuclear energy and all federal institutions, the rest going to the provinces,

devaluation of power from the provinces to the local government institutions, integration of FATA with the rest of the country. Amendment to the 8th Amendment, introduction of the proportional representative system, creation of an egalitarian society in accordance with the teachings of Islam, work for a participatory economic development, create a favourable investment climate, promote a free market economy, enlargement of the tax net, and shifting of the burden of taxes from the poor to the rich, cutting down of non-development expenditure. fillip to social services, population control and pollutionfree environment, provision for speedy and cheap justice, defence of human rights, guarantee of freedom of expression, accountability of the public representatives, discouragement of parochial, ethnic, sectarian and regional prejudices, abolition of discriminatory laws against women, protection of minorities with equal rights, implementation of the ILO [International Labor Office conventions, compensation to victims of finance and cooperative companies, development of rural and backward areas, development of national and regional languages, with a constitutional provision for it, pursuit of an independent foreign policy, moral, material, and political support to the freedom struggle of the Kashmiris, the Palestinians, and the Afghans, in deciding their own future, working for the signing of the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] on a regional basis, economic cooperation within the region, close relationship with OPEC and the Central Asian Republics, and drafting of a code of ethics for politicians and political parties.

What both manifestos have ignored is the problem of the redistribution of land. The PDA wants full implementation of Mr. Bhutto's land reforms. The NDA is silent on the issue. The development of new lands has also not been programmed.

According to some experts, Pakistan can create about one crore acres of new farmland. Nor has either of the two thought of the planting of forests, but this could come up later when programmes are shaped in the light of the two manifestos. The NDA is accusing Benazir Bhutto of trying to go for a solo flight. The PDA is whispering that the NDA is the President's Eleven so there are personal and political suspicions. But they are likely to be removed as the movement progresses, or, at least, lose their sting.

But for the first time in our turbulent history, there is consensus on basic changes in the constitution and on a devolution of power. This is no mean achievement. Much of Zia's mischief will be behind us if the situation develops as envisioned. The nation is ready for a change. The NDA and the PDA promise it, and this time they cannot forget their commitments. The IJI has nothing to offer except the despicable *status quo*. Its days are numbered in view of the current historical development. Yes, there is hope.

Damaging Political Process

93AS0206B Lahore THE NATION in English 16 Nov 92 p 9

[Article by Inayatullah: "Mobocracy or Democracy?"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Barring an exception or two, no Third World country is free of disorder and disharmony. There may be a difference of degree but order and harmony are seldom the hall-marks of these societies.

Why is this so?

To find an answer we have to look into the nature of these societies and the contours of conditions prevailing at the time of independence along with the burden of expectations in the context of constraints and limitations. Only a few of these newly emergent states were blessed with sustained outstanding leadership. India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia standout as especially lucky in having a popular founding father (Nehru, Bandranaike and Tunku Abdur Rehman) at the helm of affairs for a considerable length of time. These leaders had the vision, influence and time to pull the diverse elements of the nation together and launch the democratic process and also to take care of the teething troubles.

Pakistan like most other developing countries was not that lucky. Its founding father—the Quaidi-Azam-expired within a year or so. His successor lacked the Quaid's vision, calibre and acumen. He, however, wielded considerable influence as the Quaid's unchallenged successor. Unfortunately he couldn't rise to the formidable tasks facing the nation. His three years neither saw the making of the much-needed Constitution nor the very-much-desired national elections. Without underplaying the complexity and magnitude of the challenges he had to cope with, it can be said that the beginnings of intriguing, dissension and disorder may be traced back to his years of national stewardship. This writer is at the same time fully conscious of the considerable contributions made by Liaquat Ali Khan, especially in dealing with an arrogant and hostile India. The "Quaid-i-Millat" was assassinated. We all are familiar with what followed. The politicians fudged and flunked. A disabled Governor-General could with impunity dismiss a sitting Prime Minister with a majority in the House and there was hardly any protest. Not even a mouse squeaked. It didn't take long for the best organised institution in the country to take over, with bureaucracy as its willing junior partner.

The political process was thus subverted. After the long night of the military rule under the two Khans, the country (since reduced to its Western half—thanks to our stupidities and India's military intervention to avail to the "opportunity of the century") picked up "wits pieces" and recommenced its journey on the road to democracy. Bhutto's brand of the democratic order, however, bristled with aberrations and distortions. To

mention a few-the dismissal of the Balochistan government and the blatant use of the army there, the vengeful trial of Wali Khan and his colleagues, the raising of a civilian force to take care of the Opposition, unnecessary and undesirable amendments in the Constitution, Dalai Camp and the way Mr. Rahim a senior Minister was humiliated and tortured....His craze for total power ultimately landed him in serious trouble. His massive rigging of elections in 1977 was resisted and rejected by the people and the ensuing disorder pulled the army back into the saddle. The second spell of Martial Law was almost as long as the first one. None may deny Ziaul Hag's heroic role in resisting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan but it also brought into our body politic the lethal evils of Kalashnikov and drugs. The ethnic factor too raised its head during his time. The present Constitution is a legacy of the dictator. His successor Chief of the Army staff wisely refrained from holding on to the reins of power, and the last four years have seen two party-based elections. The first of these brought the PPP Pakistan People's Party] under Benazir Bhutto back into power. She, however, could not complete her term, being dismissed on charges of corruption and mismanagement under the provisions of the much-maligned 8th Amendment. This act of the President has since been upheld by the Supreme Court. She was succeeded by an interim government headed by the ever-available Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who filed "references" against the former Prime Minister in special courts with a view to vindicating the charges levelled against her at the time of dismissal. He also held the scheduled elections. In these elections, Nawaz Sharif the arch-rival of Benazir emerged victorious and as the most powerful leader of the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] took over as Prime Minister.

The PPP and some of the Opposition parties complained of rigging of the national elections. They, however, did not hesitate to contest the subsequent provincial elections and de facto and de jure accepted the results with their successful candidates taking the Oath as Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies. By joining the Assemblies and participating in its proceedings the PPP, for all practical purposes, accorded due recognition to the Nawaz Sharif government.

It, however, along with a few dejected and disgruntled Opposition leaders kept up the grouse that the elections were "stolen" and have persisted in their outcry long enough and have made enough noise to convince themselves that these were in fact "rigged." A White Paper too was issued and appeals made to "godfathers" abroad.

The fact of the matter is that

(a) The PPP by not organising a public protest soon after the elections and by joining the Assemblies, lost the opportunity to reject the electoral results. (b) The PPP is very much a part of the political set-up born of the 1990 elections as the acknowledged Opposition in the National Assembly and three Provincial Assemblies.

(c) By taking the oath of membership of the assemblies PPP is solemnly bound by oath to defend the Constitution, which means that it has to abide by the Constitutional procedure.

(d) If the PPP is desirous of removing the IJI government, it has to follow the prescribed constitutional procedure by tabling a vote of no-confidence or persuading the President to exercise his special discretionary powers to dissolve the Assembly.

The PPP's political power in the Assembly is much too inadequate for the success of a no-confidence motion. It also knows that it cannot persuade the President to do the needful. The party has out of sheer frustration decided to by-pass the Constitution, subvert the parliamentary political process, and is out to mobilise the masses somehow to overthrow the government. The PPP may have many a genuine grievance against the government, the government may (and in fact has) committed quite a few acts of serious omission and commission, but is it proper and appropriate to ditch democratic norms and values, defy the Constitution, hurl all propriety to the winds by resorting to unabashed rabble-rousing and thus throw out the baby with the bath water? The open call to anarchy will cause colossal damage not only to the political process but also spawn highly undesirable tendencies for unconstitutional and wild free-for-all adventures which cannot by any stretch of imagination serve the interests of society and the country. Such a recourse to mobocracy will also inflict a mortal blow to the political party rooting for it. And the possibility cannot be ruled out that the "Long March" and the "sit ins" may cause enough disruption, violence and disorder that a reluctant army may in spite of itself, get sucked into the seat of power.

How will this serve the cause of the people currently suffering from hundred and one ills and evils?

Does Benazir really want another Martial Law? What about her proclaimed loyalty and dedication to the cause of democracy? She has also to realise that the present government flawed and stupid it may well be in many respects has to its credit considerable achievements and commands enough strength and resources not be cowed into submission or surrender to unreasonable demands and pressures. And above all the army and the President do not appear to be disposed to get rid of it. As a wise politician, Benazir ought seriously to calculate the cost of her failure as there is no guarantee that her latest outlandish moves will certainly meet with success.

Our external situation is none too encouraging. India's refusal to hand over the bodies of two Pakistani nationals, killed in cold blood, is an indication of how emboldened and supercilious our hostile neighbour has become because of our internal dissensions and looming

destabilisation. A new American President is about to take over the reins of the most powerful office in the world. If Pakistan remains divided and weak it will neither command influence nor respect with him. A whole new order is knocking at our door. Our leaders have to keep this new volatile world in view.

Let not our personal and partisan interests blind us to the grim realities surrounding us. Benazir will be doing a lot of good to herself, her party and the country if she picks up wisdom and courage to exercise self-restraint and not rush headlong into disruption and destruction. After long years of horrendous military rule, Pakistan is beginning to trudge once again on the democratic path. Let us resolve to do everything to keep to the course and not be deflected by petty and selfish considerations. The country has to come first.

Nawaz Sharif too should get off his high horse, curb his ego, accept the PPP as a major national force, honour its leaders and do everything possible to relieve them of unnecessary irritations and agony.

His response to the call-for-arms should be a firm hand of conciliation and cooperation. This may well be his biggest contribution to the building of democracy and to the strengthening of the country.

The President too could play a constructive role in bringing the two together.

Let us join our heads and hands to save the constitutional order, further the cause of democracy and build bridges of understanding and amity instead of conspiring to eliminate each other, creating disruption and anarchy and thus ruin our society, our economy and the country itself.

Let us respond to the clarion call of our Quaid to "Unity, Faith and Discipline." We can honour him only by following in his footsteps. Do we have the courage and the will to heed his voice?!

Bhutto U-Turn

93AS0206C Lahore THE NATION in English 15 Nov 92 p 10

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "The Long March"]

[Text] In what will probably rank as the swiftest and most substantive political U-turn in contemporary Pakistani politics, Ms. Benazir Bhutto's announcement of a Long March to "storm the Capital" underlines her Party's reversal on a wide array of issues. These include:

• Less than a year, after the December 19, 1991 public display of ire against President Ghulam Ishaq Khan inside the Parliament building when PPP [Pakistan People's Party] legislators led by Benazir Bhutto chanted "go Baba go" in a rhythmic fashion, the Long Marchers are now reposing their confidence in the same President and pleading with him to sack Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly;

• When President Ghulam Ishaq Khan used his powers under the 8th Amendment of the Constitution to sack Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly on August 6, 1990, the PPP has termed the 8th Amendment as "illegal, immoral and unconstitutional." Now it is urging that the same 8th Amendment which it had long derided as a Zia legacy be used against its political detractors;

 During her November 10 Press conference, Benazir Bhutto went to the extent of even "not ruling out non-political ways." In effect, not ruling out the possibility of direct military intervention as a conse-

quence of the proposed Long March.

Benazir Bhutto's explanation for this political U-turn is that "I believe in pragmatic politics and not idealistic politics. And I will go for pragmatic solutions." These contradictions and U-turn apart, this "now or never" political gamble on the part of the PPP needs to be analysed in terms of its timing, its key unstated assumptions and some lessons from the PPP's own historical past given that it is going to celebrate 25 years of its foundation on November 30, 1992.

Different explanations are being offered for Benazir Bhutto's gamble. For hardened conspiracy-theorists, and Islamabad does produce the best conspiracy-theorists East of Suez, one view that has gained widespread acceptance is that "she must have got a nod from somewhere, otherwise she would not be that foolhardy." In other words, Benazir Bhutto only announced the Long March after either a wink from Aiwan-e-Sadr or a nod from GHQ [General Headquarters], or so the conspiracy-theorists would like to believe.

Another explanation is that Benazir Bhutto was pushed into the Long March due to wrong assumptions, especially advice from the long-lost uncles whom she has recently embraced and who, incidentally, were not exactly known for their loyalty to her late father in the weeks preceding his execution.

Finally, one other explanation being offered for Benazir Bhutto's announcement for the Long March is that this is simply plain misreading of the popular mood, the mood in her own party, which, after all, will be providing the bulk of the cadres and activists for this endeavour, and equally importantly, the mood in the power structure. This explanation makes sense given the fact that on at least four previous occasions in the last 13 years, the PPP's misreading of signals was politically costly for the party and its leaders. In 1979, Pakistan's most popular leader after the Quaid-i-Azam, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was led to the gallows and neither did a deal materialise with the Army nor did international appeals help and, the key factor, the PPP leadership was just not interested in mobilising street power to get a reprieve for their leader.

In 1985, when General Zia was forced to announce non-Party polls after the referendum had drawn a blank,

the PPP's boycott helped the military regime and three years later, the PPP entered the same system on the same ground rules under the same Election Commissioner which it had denounced in 1985. General Zia was so elated at the MRD's [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] boycott of the 1985 elections that he called the Editor of a Lahore daily in a jubilant tone saying "Thank God, the MRD is not taking part in these elections." In 1986, when Benazir Bhutto returned to a triumphant home-coming on April 10, the intensity and the emotion-charged crowd had few parallels in Pakistani history, and yet, 6 months later, in September 1986, when Benazir Bhutto tried to dislodge the Zia-Junejo government through street power, her muchtouted "Doves of Democracy" simply did not fly, because they just did not exist! And in 1990, an operating assumption of the PPP government under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was that neither a military coup nor Presidential action could dislodge her government, since, she felt assured the United States would not allow it. As it turned out, the United States Government was the first and only government to endorse her sacking as a "constitutional action."

As far as timing is concerned, somehow the PPP is convinced that after the Nawaz Sharif government gets through to January 1993, it is likely to stay put. This timeframe needs to be understood in three different contexts: the references filed by the President against her, one or two of which are said to be nearing judgement. Then the United States Administration is in transition following the elections and once a new government is in place in Washington on January 20, the perception probably is that it would mean a normal business-as-usual relationship between Islamabad and Washington and hence, little possibility of political hanky-panky that this transition timeframe may provide. Another aspect of this somewhat inexplicable timeframe is probably on account of the Army still being involved in Sindh, at least till January, which gives the GHQ a direct role in decision-making since Sindh has wider national political implications. Therefore, this timeframe apparently sees a more conducive ambience for getting the Army dragged into a direct political role.

This timing which is directed at three of the different power centres that the PPP is targeting, namely, the President, the GHQ and the United States, needs to be examined threadbare. If the PPP is offering a carrot to the President in the form of unstinted support for his second Presidential term, going by present indications, such support is already by and large forthcoming from the current Assemblies. Then, why should the president prefer the PPP over the present incumbent? After all, the President still feels, despite the Supreme Court's endorsement, that it is only after a judgement of conviction of Benazir Bhutto in one of the several references that have been filed by him will there be a full and complete vindication of his August 6, 1990 dismissal of her government.

The second assumption apparently seeks the Army as an ally to knock out a system in which the Army has never had it so good. It is free from the odium of Martial Law since the triarchy gives it clout and influence without the responsibility of governance or sharing blame for running the country which goes directly to the politicians. The Army's political stock is very high, especially after the Tando Bahawal verdict where the Chief of the Army Staff, General Asif Nawaz, set new standards of accountability and justice unprecedented in the annals of the Pakistan Army. Given this context, why should the Army then get its fingers burnt by becoming embroiled in a political mess, more so, after it is aware of the political pitfalls from its Sindh experience.

As far as the United States is concerned, the PPP under Benazir Bhutto has been one of those political forces which have held the mistaken notion that the road to Islamabad lies through Washington. The most that Washington can do in the context of the Long March is to protest over "human rights violations," should there be casualties in a clash between the Long Marchers and the security forces. Other than that, apart from the fact that the American Administration is going through its own post-election transition, the United States is highly unlikely to view a Long March on Islamabad in a positive light given that all three previous attempts to "storm the Capital"—1979, when the American Embassy was burnt, 1980, when the Shia agitation took place and 1989, when the demonstration against Salman Rushdie occurred—had anti-Americanism as common threads running through all of them. In any case, this time around, with the PPP backed by the TNFJ's [Tehrik-i-nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria] highly-motivated and dedicated cadres, whom the U.S. dreads as "Islamic radicals," the Americans are even more unlikely to welcome a Long March whose route to the Parliament Building will pass by the American Centre in Islamabad.

Bluff is often necessary as a means of keeping the opponent guessing. Benazir Bhutto's father, for instance, used the technique of bluff very effectively when all through the 1970 long-drawn election campaign, he kept threatening to "spill the secrets of Tashkent." Although there were no secrets to spill, yet nobody called his bluff, hence it was not politically harmful to him or the PPP. In the case of Benazir Bhutto, she is making sure that her bluff will be called, a development which will neither help the cause of democracy in the country nor be a plus for the PPP. In any case, by personalising her politics to the extent that is being done by the Long March, principles are being relegated to the background. The PPP rightly feels cheated out in Sindh, but, ironically, that is one issue on which there is a consensus in the triarchy since all three have worked on propping the government of Chief Minister Muzaffar Hussain Shah in Sindh. Or the other argument of Benazir Bhutto that the Army should be "neutral" and not be used by the government is fine, but, going by the same argument means admitting that it was wrong for the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to use the Army against his political opponents in Balochistan in 1973 or during the PNA [Pakistan National Alliance] agitation in 1977.

Notwithstanding the PPP's U-turns and contradictions in politics, the government too is not blameless either, particularly for its failure to establish a normal working relationship with the Opposition which is the norm in any civilised, democratic polity. The political feuding has gone to such an extent that even normal Eastern courtesies are dispensed with like, say, the Leader of the House saying, "Salam Elaikum" to the Leader of the Opposition when they are only 3 feet apart form each other in the National Assembly.

What is more unfortunate in the present Long March is not whether the PPP is able to "mobilise" millions as it claims or whether the government is able to thwart this threat of street power on the Capital. Given the PPP's track record of the last few years, mass mobilisation not only seems a tall task but also a secondary goal, the more important accent being on a "body count" which would have the necessary fallout at home and abroad. The government can oblige in this endeavour if it loses its nerves by pushing the panic-buttons. The real lesson on the Long March lies in the inability of politicians and political forces to establish "rules of the game" in the country's political system and their abiding failure to learn any lessons from Pakistan's chequered political past.

Democracy Failing

93AS0206D Lahore THE NATION in English 15 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Shireen Mazari: "The Final Nail in the Coffin of Democratic Polity and Structure"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The long march envisaged by the political Opposition in Pakistan on November 18 should be the appropriate end to the fragile foundations of democracy that came up in autumn 1988—after 11 years of repressive dictatorship. Yet, since the coming to power of the first post-Zia democratic regime, the very structures on which democracy was premised—that is, adult franchise and the Parliament—have been undermined by those who came to hold power in this system.

Perhaps one should have seen the signs very early on when the non-democratic holders of power handed over the reins of government to the elected representatives after backroom wheeling and dealing. Thus the first blow to democracy was struck in the political compromises that Ms Bhutto only too eagerly accepted in order to gain ascendancy to the Prime Ministership. The irony is that after the electoral results no one could have denied her that office and so the political horse-trading over the Presidency was not only unnecessary, it set the tone for the future course of politics.

The now infamous horse-trading that went on around the vote of no-confidence is only too well known. For the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad], the new democratic norms seemed to be mere irritants since a number of its leaders had been given their induction into politics in the Zia dictatorship. Not that Ms Bhutto's people were lagging behind in intrigue and backroom deals as they sought to unseat the Punjab government. That they were unsuccessful in their Punjab operation was not for want of trying—only their local leadership spearheaded by the arch "tumandar"—bureaucrat Farooq Leghari lacked the necessary humility to win over lesser mortals in the Opposition!

With Ms Bhutto unable to take full control over policy-making—especially in the critical defence and foreign policy issue areas—and impeded operationally by an increasingly ambitious and partisan President and an increasingly hostile and politicised military, Parliament had already become sidelined by the time her government was removed from power.

Other than hurling abuses and expending time over petty squabbles, Parliament did little in terms of substantive legislative work. In any event, with Ms Bhutto looking abroad for rapture and admiration and her coterie of advisers busy in following the national tradition of corruption that extends beyond political systems and personalities, the crux of the democratic system—responsiveness to the electorate and the strengthening of the Parliament—were reduced to ridicule. It is no wonder that the President could play his partisan role so assertively and cut short Ms Bhutto's Prime Ministerial tenure.

The period that followed reduced the remnants of the democratic structure to a complete farce. With the non-democratic and bureaucratic forces only too happy to undermine the essentials of a system which denies them supremacy, electoral rigging was done on a scale that left one with an utter feeling of helplessness and despair. Strangely enough, at that time, when a "long march," or at least an electoral boycott of provincial elections would certainly have been morally justified, Ms Bhutto and her team of advisers seemed loathe to fight to protect the democratic system. Having been inducted into the "system"—albeit briefly—they seemed unable to possess the will to rectify it.

Of course, the Sharif government built upon the institution of corruption that had over the decades taken firm root and actively encouraged governance by "troika"—as long as economic decision-making remained within his domain. The largesse was spread wide, especially to keep the "man on the hill" happy by favouring his kith and kin! That some of them began exceeding even the bounds of acceptable political behaviour did not perturb the Big Man himself.

Over the course of the Sharif incumbency, Parliament has become totally sidelined and politics are conducted increasingly through the media and expensive public rallies. The Prime Minister has still to feel at ease in Parliament—which explains why he rarely acknowledges

its existence. This trend has of course allowed politicians with little or no electoral strength to try and carve out little niches of power outside of the parliamentary system.

The unfortunate part of this whole exercise in futility is that the nation has to endure the absurdity of seeing its political elites embroiled in political wheeling-dealing and attempts at undermining parliamentary processes even further—while economic problems and natural calamities afflict the masses. The ridiculousness of these shenanigans is reflected in the fact that while both the governing party and the Opposition find it quite acceptable to deal with the President and the military leadership, they find it impossible to hold a civilised political dialogue amongst themselves.

The result is that the President manipulates the politicians at will and the military casts a foreboding shadow as the nation suffers a law and order failure. While one can understand Mr Sharif's ease in dealing with non-democratic forces—given his political rearing by the Zia regime—Ms Bhutto's sudden penchant for consorting with such forces is a little harder to explain, except that perhaps having tasted power once, she and her coterie will try anything to have that power restored.

That she has finally asserted that she may well accept a non-democratic alternative to the continuance of Mr Sharif in office makes a mockery of the sacrifices her followers made—some with their lives—for the restoration of democracy in this country. While there is no denying that political polarisation and the ruling coalition's intransigence may have led Ms Bhutto to despair, surely the electoral process itself and the proper use of the Parliament should have been tested as more proper options than street agitation.

Given the direction in which the political elites have been moving since the restoration of democracy, it seems to be of little worth to take up more substantive structural problems prevailing within Pakistan's democratic system today—such as the issue of the Eighth Amendment. When Parliament and the electorate is going to be ignored in any case, and the political elites of all shades voluntarily pander to the military and the presidency and political brokering takes place outside of parliamentary norms—the removal of the Eighth Amendment in itself will matter little until the political elites develop a sense for respecting the norms of parliamentary democracy.

At present it is quite apparent that this is the missing link in Pakistan's propagation of democratic processes on paper and the lack of acceptance of the obligations and norms of such a system by its ruling elites. The "long march" which is said to have been undertaken after an understanding between the political opposition—the elected representatives—and the "man on horseback," will finally end substantively the democratic system the nation fought so hard for. Whether it ends with "a bang" or "a whimper" hardly seems to matter in the end.

Only Opening Act

93AS0206E Lahore THE NATION in English 15 Nov 92 p 9

[Article by Husain Naqi: "Implications of the 'Long March"; quotation marks and italicized words as published!

[Text] An apolitical response to a political move of the Opposition was the option initially chosen by the Nawaz Sharif administration for dealing with the 'long march' scheduled for the coming Wednesday. The proposed demonstration appeared a bit early to many but could not be described as haughty or unwarranted in view of the stubborn attitude adopted vis-a-vis the Opposition by a government whose legitimacy was questionable ever since its intriguing sweep of the October 1990 polls.

The Opposition led by Ms Benazir Bhutto, had acted wisely not to launch a stir against electoral rigging for a host of reasons. During her 18-month rule, she had found the Establishment bitterly opposed to her ascent to power. The then Chief of Army Staff, though not in a position to stage a coup d'etat, was yet hand in-glove with her opponents and had engineered the formation of the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] electoral alliance. The President also had a disliking for her. Her own cabinet colleagues and party influentials had indulged in malpractices and corruption and were also unpopular with her party rank and file. Her removal from the office of the Prime Minister also did not cause any ripples internationally as the polls were announced and she and her party were allowed to participate. Allegations against her government were also believed to be true in diplomatic circles.

Now, more than two years of the Nawaz Sharif government and its track record was testimony enough for those at home and abroad to consider Benazir and her close associates to be much less guilty than those who followed them in the seat of power. Corruption, grab, plunder of public funds, misuse of power, nepotism, financial scams, bullying of adversaries, were all so transparent that even friends and apologists of the regime find it difficult to defend or compare it favourably as against the government headed by Benazir Bhutto. The media did not defend the regime for its merits but talked about the so-called danger to the democratic process, further deterioration of law and order and loss of private and public property if street power was unleashed against the regime.

There was hardly any logic in their flimsy arguments in defence of an administration whose head did not feel any shame in asking the newspaper editors to put a moratorium on publicising political activities. And now, in response to the Opposition leaders' call, accused Ms Bhutto of subversion while some of his colleagues threatened to crush the ensuing protest with State power. What else could it be described as except combating political activity through the power of the gun? If that was for posturing and to put up a brave face while being engaged

in a war of nerves, it would be okay. However, if the regime's policy-makers put the same into practice and try to crush dissent, vocal and massive as it is expected to be, then the situation is surely likely to get out of control. It would be advisable that public anger should not be provoked to turn into mob fury. The Establishment would do itself good to advise its surrogates to acknowledge the public anger which had grown over the years since Mr Nawaz Sharif was hand-picked by the military dictator to further his objectives.

The price spiral, widespread unemployment amongst the educated youth and skilled and unskilled manpower, public anger against the high-handedness of the regime's musclemen, the police, the magistracy and functionaries in public-dealing departments, the trauma faced by massive sections of the rural populace, corruption by those enjoying power and pelf, along with their cronies, were enough to agitate them. Any attempt to suppress the same, through the very same machinery they recognise to be oppressive, could only infuriate the people at large. Political moves of the adversary needed to be checkmated with better political counter-moves.

The PDA's [People's Democratic Alliance] 'long march' call was supported tacitly by quite a few other political parties. Quite a few stalwarts of the recently-formed National Democratic Alliance [NDA] expect to find a berth in the PDA-demanded interim government. Some other parties, particularly those of the far right, would not be joining the PDA movement but would neither defend nor try to save the Nawaz Sharif government. Jama'at-e-Islami is the most notable amongst them, whose Amir, Qazi Hussain Ahmad said the other day that they felt no obligation to save the present government. Similar was the response from Tahir-ul-Qadri. Coming at a time when the government was trying for the inclusion of a religion column in the National Identity Card, an active response from the minorities for the PDA platform could be expected.

As the announcement electrified the political atmosphere, the PDA stir would positively contribute in initiating a serious debate on political, economic and social issues. It would prevent side-tracking of the same through kicking up dust through non-issues or fanning sectarian hatred.

The political opposition in general and the PDA, particularly its major component, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party], should be aware that the 'long march' will not be the end of the tunnel. There are many blind alleys within the dark tunnel. The Establishment had become so rotten during General Ziaul Haq's misrule that it needed a complete overhaul if not its total replacement. It was so ignorant and, at the same time so self-righteous, that it could not be expected to grasp the most urgent and pressing needs of the common man, particularly those inhabiting the underdeveloped and backward regions of the country.

Engaged in the mad race for amassing riches and multiplying their possessions, they chose to ignore even the basic duties of a government in a developing State. This created anarchy, of far more serious dimension, in shelter, health, education and the employment sectors. Its bizarre policies gave rise to the emergence of mafialike operators, dominating the scene in place of a representative and accountable government. While the Opposition proposed interim government could not undertake cleansing task, it would be required to stem the rot and stop plunder till the representative government replaced it. Those who aspire to assume that responsibility should be doing their home-work so that they come prepared to take many a corrective step urgently and expeditiously. As for those aspiring to be part of the interim government, they would be required to supervise and ensure free and fair polls, unlike the ones the people suffered earlier and especially in 1990. The right of every citizen (and not only a National Identity Card holder) to exercise his franchise must be fully assured. Fudged 'votes,' and those who cast them, would have to be excluded from the voters lines while all the eligible ones should find access to polling booths and cast their ballots. Those supervising the polls would be required to be properly trained and those watching on behalf of the contestants should be vigilant and aware of their responsibility. Few, if any, political parties could claim to be prepared for the expected great event. Unfortunately, the largest one, the PPP, had never gone to the polls in an organised way except in 1970.

All that is still distant. The 'long march' is just the first milestone on the way. Whether it is allowed or prevented by strongarm and violent methods, it would serve the purpose. In fact, if it is crushed, the political movement would be on in all parts of the country from where the marchers were to start their scheduled journey. A clamp-down by the government against the Opposition leadership and active workers. would only harden their position and place the leadership in the hands of less experienced and more angry men and women. A situation resembling the late '60s, or the one witnessed before General Zia's coup d'etat, (instead of what was observed in '78 or '90), was likely to merge if the government tried to settle political scores through the language of guns, tear-gas shells and such like tools. Certainly, the stakes for the present incumbents to stay in the seat of power are very high. The same are no less for the Opposition or the people groaning under unbearable hardships. The socio-political situation is pregnant with all sorts of possibilities. The 'great game' has begun. The Establishment, the ones installed by them but having faltered and fumbled, and the Opposition, having demonstrated enough patience and waited for a negotiated accommodation/settlement, are now on the course that has acquired the status of our political tradition. Who are to be the victors and who the losers is yet to be decided. What an optimist would safely predict is that democracy won't be lost and there would be more of it for our people, particularly those in the lower strata who yearned for but had tasted very little of it since the country's establishment.

Mullahs Said Nixing Population Control Plans 93AS0263D Lahore THE FRIDAY TIMES in English 25 Nov 92 p 9

[Article by Zeid Bakr: "Senators Discover Shortage of Manpower"]

[Text] We have a senate which sometimes debates matters of great public import. The senate has members who make speeches. Sometimes the senate also reaches a conclusion. Not that it matters very greatly. It did my heart good therefore, to learn of the fact that the august chamber took time out from other pressing matters to examine the question of population growth. This news was brought to the nation by THE NEWS of November 9, 1992 in story titled "Senators rap govt for lack of attention to population control."

The first interesting fact to emerge from the story is, "State Minister for population Rana Nazir Ahmad was not present in the senate during the discussion on this important issue. Even some of the senators showed their reservation over the absence of the concerned minister." Now, I don't see why the reporter should consider "population planning" more important than whatever the minister happened to be doing at the time. For all we know the minister of state may well have been busy planning population which, if true, would be a great deal more useful than listening to the likes of senators from Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam. Besides, the minister in question has had his run-in with the bearded ones recently and been slapped on the knuckles by our progressive and forward looking prime minister who is busy constructing the motorway in order to facilitate the journey Mansura wallas will make from Lahore to Islamabad. If the Mullas bring the darkest of medieval obfuscation with them in their baggage, they will at least travel on a modern artery.

I was somewhat intrigued by the report that the "senate unanimously targeted the government for its non serious attitude towards controlling the population." Unanimous? Had the state minister for population planning acted more cleverly than the reporter gave him credit for? Had he enticed the hirsute ones away so that the rest of the senate could express unanimous concern? Or was there unanimity because everyone had given up to the fundos and, having turned against population planning, berated the government for having a ministry for that function at all, even [if] it did nothing? Not quite. The truth is closer to reality. Some senators were angry with the government for not doing enough to combat this menace while others were against doing anything about it. Of the latter, the most prominent perhaps was that irrepressible sphinx of our politics, the unparalleled Senator who styles himself Professor Khurshid Ahmed.

"About the Islamic view on population control, he said there is no restriction in family planning if it is within the framework of Islam." Who will read this riddle? Population control, according to Senator Professor Khurshid, is lawful in Islam if it is lawful in Islam. Clear as the murk of a fundamentalist argument. But that was by the way. Professor Khurshid's real arguments are different. "Balochistan and Frontier provinces are under populated while Punjab and Sindh has big population. The population problem is a problem of urban areas whereas the rural areas may absorb even more population." Professor Sahib, I understand, lays claim to scholarship in economics so one may venture to ask him how he defines under and over population. Is a country, province, city or village overpopulated only when everyone breathes thrice breathed air? Does the land's ability to sustain human life have something to do with the desirable density of population? Would differences in this capacity have something to do with the variation in the size of the population of each area? Professor Sahib is not likely to accept a suggestion from one who is neither a senator nor a professor but I would like to remind him that confining himself to the Frontier and Balochistan may mean that he is likely to find himself short of land in the not too distant future. He should look further in order to find a more durable solution. May I suggest the practically uninhabited lands of the Arctic and Antarctica. There are also the vast unpeopled deserts of Saudi Arabia. Would, one wonders, Senator Professor Khurshid Ahmed be able to prevail upon the Saudis to exhibit some solidarity with our Ummah and allow our teeming millions into their unoccupied space? If the Ummah is indeed the Ummah, the Arabs would surely welcome their brothers in the spirit of true Islamic solidarity. Don't get your hopes up though. Our Muslim brothers, even when they become as rabidly fundamentalist as the likes of those we see around us, are unlikely to spread out the red carpet for those our Mullahs are anxious to encumber the earth with.

Professor Khurshid's argument, however, leads in a different direction. Confining himself to Pakistan he says, "a major portion of the country's land has been left uncultivated because of non-availability of manpower.' Interesting, isn't it, that when people are trying to go abroad to find employment, Professor Sahib has discovered a shortage of manpower in the country. He, of course, being the sound economist he is, cannot be expected to know anything about the ecological effects of cultivating each inch of land. But even if we were to ignore that, how does he expect to make these fallow lands cultivable? When it came to a choice, would he recommend that the money that the country is forced to spend keeping the teeming millions alive, though in a miserable state, should be diverted to colonising new lands? Providing for a rapidly increasing population leaves new resources for development and that is only one of the arguments in favor of checking the rate of growth now. But there is another problem. Who is going to work on the new lands. Professor Khurshid Ahmed. considers the countryside underpopulated. It could, he claims, "absorb more population." It is not the rural population, therefore, that will be asked to cultivate these broad acres. And how is the senator going to transform the urban population into farmers?

Hafiz Hussain Ahmad is another theocrat in the senate. He had this startling fact to offer. "A number of countries are underdeveloped due to shortage of population, despite having plenty of resources." Indeed? Which ones? The senator, like jesting Pilate, would not stay for an answer. Since the fact has been revealed and since Hafiz Sahib is the only man with knowledge of the coordinates of these lands, our Overseas Employment Agencies should immediately appoint him their consultant. The transfer of population from Pakistan to these countries would be truly of mutual benefit. I have already named a few areas of the world which are underpopulated. You can think of others. Do you think we could persuade Hafiz Sahib and his like to emigrate to them?

But the fundamentalist argument, as advanced in the Senate by Professor Khurshid Ahmed and Hafiz Hussein Ahmed, is that "population can play a fundamental role in the development of the country." Whatever the merits of this opinion, it reflects the true mode of thought of the bearded fraternity. Population does play a "fundamental" role in development. It also plays a "fundamental" role in consumption. The problem is that after a certain stage its role in consumption negates the very possibility of development.

The clerical mind is incapable of seeing all sides of the picture and will, therefore, lead unerringly in the wrong direction. But support for an explosive growth of the population is the correct policy for the obscurantists. It is only a crawling, teeming population of the deprived, the unemployed, the uneducated and, therefore, bewildered, that can provide support to the likes of these two senators.

Activities, Demands of Sectarian Groups Viewed 93AS0265E New Delhi INDIA TODAY in English 15 Nov 92 pp 122-123, 125

[Article by Shekhar Gupta: "Pakistan: The Believers' Backlash"; boldface words and quotation marks as published]

[Text] As fundamentalist Shia and Sunni groups vie for control, Nawaz Sharif threatens to ban them.

Midnight knocks in Peshawar and Karachi, nearly 2,300 km apart, tellingly make one common point. The alarming rise in Islamic fundamentalism and sectarianism, for once, has even seen many of the liberals make common cause with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Government. For the liberals who have so far tended to side with former premier Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP), it is a new experience. But the fact is that today, the Government in Pakistan, which had to make a major concession to the fundamentalists by making it mandatory to mention religion on the citizen's national identity cards, feels as threatened by the sectarian revival as the liberals. A half-a-dozen groupings of various Islamic sects, who often resort to bloodshed, are locked in a desperate struggle for political supremacy in

the movement of religious revival. The situation has worried the Government so much that Nawaz Sharif has even threatened to ban 'sectarian' parties.

In Peshawar, a midnight knock led to the arrest of Anwar Ali Akahundzada, secretary-general of the Tehriki-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria (TNFJ), the most prominent organisation of Pakistani Shias, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the population. The charge: involvement in the murder of former North-West Frontier Province governor and army corps commander Fazle Haq. Named among co-conspirators was the former Iranian consul at Peshawar, Hamid Raza Sherkhudai. Haq, in turn, had been arrested on the charge of murdering former TNFJ chief Allama Arif Hussaini. The sectarian blood feud now continues, holding to ransom the peace in the frontier.

The man picked up in Karachi, 79-year old Akhter Hameed Khan, a former Indian Civil Service officer (see box) [not reproduced] is now facing a possible death sentence in a bizarre case of blasphemy. His case has become a cause celebre for the Pakistanis in a period when fundamentalist forces have been getting more vocal than they have been since Zia-ul-Haq's death. A few months ago, the Jamaat-i-Islami broke away from the ruling coalition, accusing the Government of going back on its 'Islamisation' agenda. Then came the pressure to implement the Shariat law more vigorously. "We ignored the Government's betrayal on issues like Kashmir and Afghanistan for some time. But going slow on Islamisation will never be accepted," says Jamaat chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed.

More worrying than fundamentalism is the fact of sectarianism. Besides the groupings of Shias and Sunnis, violent differences have arisen even between the subsects of the two major Islamic sects. The sectarian warfare has seen the assassination of at least six top religious heads in the past five years, with each murder leading to a chain reaction and a new blood feud. In Jhang this year, the Moharram procession of the Shias was attacked by the ultra-right wing Sunni group, Anjuman Sipahe Sahaba (ASS), or the society of the soldiers of the prophet and the caliphs. The ASS also blew up a police armoured car, killing an inspector.

The ASS, whose heavily armed members routinely carry out marches through main cities, was set up by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in 1986 as a response to the growth of the Shia TNFJ. Jhangvi was later assassinated, but his followers have grown and in fact it was the provocation from the ASS, which demands that Shias be declared apostates, that made Nawaz Sharif even threaten the sectarian parties with a ban.

Analysts trace the roots of the phenomenon to the Zia-ul-Haq years when the martial law regime courted fundamentalist parties as they were the only ones to have made common cause with the dictatorship. The mullahs were given power far in excess of their popular support and the Frankenstein has now risen to haunt society. The

Pakistani liberals and human rights groups complain that the mullahs hold the judicial system to ransom. For instance, courts have proceeded extremely slowly against Farooq Ahmed, a 30-year-old maulvi who publicly slew Naimat Ahmer, a Christian schoolteacher and poet, in Faisalabad, for 'insulting' the Prophet.

Interestingly, not merely the liberals but also the Nawaz Sharif Government have tried to counter the threat. Ask Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, now known popularly as Sammy the Sandwich or Sexy Sammy. The Jamiati-Ulema-i-Islam leader was the prime mover of the Shariat Bill when tapes recording his escapades in an Islamabad bordello suddenly surfaced in the Islamabad social circuit. Tahira, the madam of the bordello, even stated that the maulvi's preference was for sandwich sessions with his own son-in-law and her. It is now widely believed that the tapes had been circulated by the Government's agencies to silence the maulvi. More openly, Sardar Assef, a minister in the Nawaz Sharif Cabinet, has taken on the fundamentalists, apparently with the blessings of the prime minister. But observers say though Nawaz Sharif considers the fundamentalists as an obstacle in his drive for economic modernisation, he cannot turn away from Islamisation. Nor can he restrain people like Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi, religious affairs minister in his Cabinet, who recently issued a fatwa against Benazir.

Such contradictions perhaps are only to be expected in a society where the most expensive brands of foreign liquor are served liberally in the subterranean social whirl, frequented by politicians as well as bureaucrats, while the Government crushes under bulldozers thousands of bottles of confiscated Scotch. Where a virtual cultural renaissance is taking place, at least in the major cities under the very noses of the mullahs. At any given time now there are at least a half-a-dozen plays being staged in Karachi and after years, Pakistani women have had the courage to hold dance recitals.

Though it is widely known that many Sunni groups, particularly the ASS, have the support of Saudi Arabia, the Iranians are backing the TNFJ. And TNFJ chief Allama Sajid Ali Naqvi says the motive of "some foreign powers" is to keep the Islamic world divided into sects and to counter the revolution emanating from Iran. But he does add, as an after-thought, that the differences between the various sects are "very significant." Example: "Take Islamic jurisprudence. The Sunnis say cut the thief's hands from the wrists. We say, just cut the fingers from the palms."

Religious ID Cards Claimed Threatening To Minorities

93AS0263A Karachi DAWN in English 12 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Nisar Osmani: "ID Proposal to Further Isolate Minorities"]

[Text] Lahore, Nov 11—The Minister of State for Minority Affairs, Mr. Peter John Sahotra, has reportedly submitted his resignation following the unpleasant episode at Faisalabad where he was beaten up by angry Christians demonstrating against the proposal to put the holder's religion in his national identity card.

The Christian community has been agitating over the issue since the Federal Government took a decision in this regard. Processions are being taken out almost every day. Hunger strikes are being observed by the workers and leaders, including Mr. Patras Ghani whose strike unto death has entered its second week. The agitation has spread to other towns and even in London. Christians of Pakistani origin have staged a demonstration.

The Sindh Assembly (although sharply divided over other issues) has unanimously adopted a resolution urging the Federal Government to withdraw the decision—an initiative which has embarrassed the Islamabad administration and incurred the wrath of Religions Affairs Minister Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi who is the brain behind the proposal.

Governments in Pakistan, both Federal and provincial, have been known for adding to their problems raising crises and turning non-issues into issues. But here is an issue which is totally uncalled-for, adding to the plethora of pressing problems already facing the government and the people.

The proposal, which is likely to isolate further the minorities from the mainstream, will only aggravate the situation and add to the sense of deprivation among them. The sense of isolation began with the introduction of separate electorate during the Zia regime.

One can easily recall the days when the non-Muslims—Christians, Hindus and Parsis—took active part in the country's social and political life. They were occupying key posts and were in the Federal Governments—to name a few, most of the Islamic constitution of 1956 was passed with deputy speaker C.E. Gibton in the chair, then the renowned jurist Mr. A.R. Cornelius occupied the distinguished office of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, many others were selected for diplomatic and other assignments.

They were there in every walk of life—in sports, in education, in medicine and in social welfare and their services in the 1965 war were duly recognised. But the introduction of separate electorates isolated them, cutting them off from the mainstream.

Now they cannot vote for a Muslim candidate in the election. Their elected representatives can never become Prime Minister or President. They can never dream of holding key offices in the government.

An average non-Muslim can seldom approach the MNA [Member of National Assembly] or MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly] of his constituency for the redressal of individual or collective grievances.

The Hindus living in a Thar village are represented by another Hindu in far off and crowded Karachi. A Christian in Sargodha by a member of his own community settled in distant Lahore. Thus the legislator and the electorate have hardly any contact with each other. Similarly, it is next to impossible for a non-Muslim candidate in the elections to go to far off villages, at times only a cluster of houses in far-flung villages, in Balochistan, Sindh or for that matter Punjab and the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] to convass and campaign as the adventure would require him to go to scores of distant places, consuming weeks and millions of rupees. Thus Muslim and non-Muslim voters are totally separated, so are their elected representatives.

To argue that the non-Muslims should not oppose the addition of the religious column in the identity cards as it is already there in the passports is both unfair and irrational. To equate the identity card with passports has hardly any justification. Passports are in the possession of a small minority of citizens who are required to show them to immigration officials only at the time of embarkation, before leaving the country. But identity cards are needed almost every day and by every person. Minus a card, you cannot apply for a driving licence, you cannot get yourself registered as a voter, you cannot buy or sell property, you cannot apply for a government job, you cannot open a bank account and you cannot get a case registered. An average citizen comes into contact with government official fairly often.

There are reports that at a later stage the identity cards issued to the Muslims and non-Muslims will have different colours, and so the segregation will be total and complete.

But ultimately the ill-advised proposal could lead to something much more serious, which could pose a threat to national unity itself. The rapidly increasing threats of sectarianism and obscurantism could turn Islam from the position of cementing force into a divisive factor. Who is a true Muslim with genuine spiritual bona fides? The question may divide the Ummah into Shias and Sunnis and later into Deubandis and Barelvis, Hanafis and non-Hanafi's, Wahabis and non-Wahabis, etc. This vicious circle could go on endlessly. The religious books of the various sects are already full of venomous material questioning each other's faith. And the menace is very old. Decades ago, Allama Mohammad Iqbal could foresee it and made a pointed reference to it when he said: Deen-i-Mullah Fi Sabeelillah Fasaad.

The world is at the threshold of the 21st century. We are about to enter a new world—altogether different from the past. This is the age of international communications and media networks, of dish antenna of international telephone dialling of global culture and music, of world economy, of free mixing with foreigners, of increasing tourist traffic, of many more youngmen and women going for education in foreign universities, of more Pakistanis seeking the citizenship of other countries. As all this is going on we are taking steps which could take

us to the forlorn island of isolation, that could introduce religious division and segregation, almost apartheid.

Will not such steps that amount to swimming against the current, lead to a split of national personality, causing problems for our psyche? Are not we making an issue out of a non-issue? Are not we already divided into various columns—vertical and horizontal? Are not we creating conditions that could turn our country into laughing stock of the comity of nations?

But apart from these, some other questions also agitate the mind how many other Muslim countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia or some Arab countries with sizeable non-Muslim populations have chosen to have such a column? And above all will the inclusion of the column make us better Muslims enabling us to practice the basic teachings of Islam? These are the questions we have to ponder before we decide to implement the proposal.

Contrasting Arguments For, Against ID Cards Presented

93AS0263G Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 16 Nov 92 pp 10-11

[Article by S.U. Kaul: "On the Cards"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Abdus Sattar Niazi has spoken again, so watch out for more cases of sedition and treason! "The opponents of the decision of inserting religion column in the ID cards are opponents of the ideology of Pakistan. They want to undo Pakistan." Niazi should know that Pakistan is made of sterner stuff. Mullahs and others have been trying for nearly a half century now, but have only managed to divide it into two. They will find further sub-division much harder.

He says that the column for religion in the ID card is essential to facilitate the smooth practice of separate electorates, thus trying to undo a wrong by committing another wrong. He further warns that as the Muslims have made tremendous sacrifices for the creation of Pakistan, they will now have to meet their obligations under religion, i.e., Islam. This sounds more like a threat of punishment and less like a reward for any sacrifices that may have been made. Non-Muslims, including Qadianis, made no efforts for the creation of Pakistan, Niazi claims, leaving one wondering why the Quaidi-Azam appointed Sir Zafrullah Khan, our representative on the Radcliffe Commission.

One would love to disagree with Niazi but, if the bombast is cut out, there is much virtue in what he has said. A card is merely meant for identity. A description of one's religion on one's card appears to be fairly benign. After all, religion is not meant to be a secret. We are allowed to proclaim it quite openly. It may even be useful. For those afraid of being sniffed out by the police when driving home after a party, a card with another religion on it may come in very handy. Remember the

increase in the Shia population when they were exempted from compulsory deduction of Zakat; are we suddenly going to see a sudden increase in the number of non-Muslims just so this facility can be availed?

The surprising thing is that, for "a fearless man of principle" he likes to pose as, Niazi has left a lot unsaid. What he should have said is that non-Muslims are not really entitled to be citizens of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan at all. He says having the column for religion is a constitutional requirement; that may be so. That document has been distorted so it is hard to understand it anymore.

Look at the opening sentence, "Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ..." We shall be one thing but are to be known as something else! The Constitution also says that "every citizen shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation..." Is it illegal to be a judge of the Federal Shariat Court? The Constitution says many things and, I am sure, a good case can be made for, as well as against the column for religion.

Citizenship is granted according to three different criteria. In most countries it is granted on the basis of birth in the country or by naturalisation after fulfilling certain residential requirements or by marriage to a national of that country. This is true for the United States of America, Great Britain, etc. In other countries it is based on your ethnicity, on birth to citizens of that country. Thus the German law considers all Germans as citizens of Germany irrespective of whether they were born in Kirghizia, or Volga or wherever. The same is true for Japan. People born to Turks living in Germany, or Koreans living in Japan are considered aliens.

The third criterion is religion. This is practiced in Israel: it may be claimed that being a Jew is belonging to a particular Arab tribe and not just belonging to the Jewish religion. I think that this is sophistry rather than logic; all you have to do is compare a Russian Jew with an Ethiopian Jew. Clearly all the two have in common is religion.

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi does not recognise such a thing as a Muslim nation. In his opinion, Muslims are a party, Hizb, with a manifesto and shared beliefs. This is true of Israel too. They have a shared belief in Judaism; they too are a multiethnic society and do belong to the Israeli nation. The same can be said for the Muslims. Shared belief is sufficient basis for nation forming, this was the thesis of the Quaid-i-Azam and Allama Iqbal. Our experience has been different, to wit Bangladesh. The primary cause of the breakup of Pakistan was that we did not wish to form a nation; we did not have the selfless, devoted leaders; we did not make the sacrifices required for nation building; the principle is not necessarily invalid.

If we are a nation based on Islam, then we have to clearly see that all Muslims anywhere have to be given automatic citizenship of Pakistan. It is also apparent that people who do not share the beliefs of Muslims cannot be considered citizens of Pakistan, as Palestinians are not considered citizens of Israel. This seems only fair and I think this defence of the column for religion in the Identity Card, i.e., as non-Muslims are not citizens of Pakistan, they have to be given separate cards which are meant to identify them from the real citizens of Pakistan.

One reason given for not having this column for religion is based on Islam being very tolerant of other religions. It is all true too but how will identification of one's religion lead to intolerance. Muslims may even treat them better than they treat their fellow Muslims. Another of quoted fact against this column is that Quaid-i-Azam promised in his speech to the Constituent Assembly that all will be equal citizens in the eyes of the state. The will of the Quaid-i-Azam cannot supersede the will of the people: the people through their elected representatives have willed that Pakistan be an Islamic state; in an Islamic state, the will of the Quaid-i-Azam is subordinate to the Will of Allah. As Muslims we should also recognise that the Quran has exhorted us, "Believers, do not take these Jews and Christians for friends," (5:52). This may reinforce the belief that non-Muslims cannot be treated equally in an Islamic state. Deeper study of the Quran may reveal the conditions under which such orders apply. Clearly, all friendly contact with non-Muslims is not prohibited as the Holy Prophet (PBUH) [Peace Be Upon Him] himself made alliances with non-Muslims.

The moderates should, however, accept that in an Islamic state a non-Muslim cannot be treated as a full citizen. A non-Muslim should be freed from the onerous duty of defense of the country; instead they should be charged a separate tax, *jizia*. They should be exempt from Zakat. They should be debarred from sensitive positions like the Presidency and various ministries.

In an Islamic state, the law is Islam, how can one expect it to be interpreted by non-Muslims? Of course, they should be given freedom to practise their religion; their churches and temples should be protected from hooligans. No one should be forced against his will to become a Muslim. Non-Muslims should be allowed to go about their business as long as they do not charge interest. In fact, it should be made plain to them that they are not citizens but subjects who have no say in how they are to be ruled. The Lord moves in mysterious ways!

The result will be that we will have a lot of people who are totally devoid of any stake in this country. Millions of potentially traitorous people; but will it be treason? After all we have said they are not from among us. If they then go against our interests, they are fighting a just war by their own lights. They are true to their own cause. But we can still accuse them of treason and hold pogroms against them. We can kill their men and carry off their women to be our slaves. It will certainly solve the servant problem. Just go down the street and kill a Christian and

carry his wife and daughter off. The Lord does move in mysterious ways!

Surely this cannot be right and, therefore, cannot be Islamic? The situation does, however, crytalise the dilemma faced by our moderate intelligentsia. They take up the issue of the ID card with great passion but when real discrimination is done they stay silent. Real discrimination is not the ID card but separate electorates; real discrimination is Mr. Bhutto's legislation declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims. They dare not say that secularisation of Pakistan will be more beneficial than the much touted Islamisation.

The simple fact is that Islam is a thinking man's religion. It asks you to constantly seek knowledge and apply it too. It is not a religion that puts everything on the plate like Judaism. It lays down only broad principles; their application will depend on the sum of human knowledge. The Mullah's Islam is different from real Islam; each Mullah's Islam is different from any other Mullah too. Until such time that thinking men can come to a consensus as to what Islam really is, the best road to progress is secularism. When such a consensus is reached, it may well turn out to be the same Western European values of democracy, secularism and human rights.

Government Hit on Agreeing to EEC Textile Quota 93AS0205E Lahore THE NATION in English 14 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Majid Sheikh: "Curtailment of EEC Textile Quota: Shocking Government Indifferent"; quotation marks and italicized words as published]

[Text] The whimper with which the Government of Pakistan has accepted further quota restriction on textile exports to the European Community has shocked business houses and thrown thousands out of work.

In what has been the single most drastic measure to restrict Pakistani exports undertaken by the EEC [European Economic Community], hundreds of garment workers have lost their jobs and crores of rupees worth of goods in the shipment or production stages have become stuck. The freezing of so much economic activity has, strangely, gone virtually unnoticed in the national Press. Even the EPB [Export Promotion Bureau] has not bothered to take up the matter with the relevant quarters. who, observers say, are not very much bothered about what happens to sectors that do not hit their interests. The overwhelming concern with just exporting yarn or simple raw cotton is a true reflection of the low priority such matters take in the still 'colonial bent' administration that runs Pakistan's day-to-day affairs. A leading exporter of value-added textiles commented: "The natives are resting in fear of their lives and the rulers are happy that they have achieved a state of calm.'

Official statistics aside, which no one any longer takes seriously, textiles earn well over 60 percent of our national resources. Being that cotton is the driving force of our economy, any dent in its processing or export ultimately make or break governments. The sudden quota restrictions that have been imposed on category 7 and 22 by the EEC has meant that the main striking weapon in the Pakistani export armour has been severely damaged. There is a reason for being alarmed. Pakistan is the world's largest producer of medium staple cotton and the two categories hit concern the bulk of products from such cotton.

To add to this situation is the fact that the Central Asian republics have started, from 1992, supplying better quality longer staple length cotton at cheaper rates to the world market. Coupled with the fact that our yarn exporters have never allowed the creation of a Ministry of Textiles to chalk out a 'long-term' textile policy, this new challenge to Pakistani cotton is going to have an even more dramatic effect on exports. The EEC quota on the former 'quota-free' areas has been partly inspired by the new supply venues that have opened up. This year, according to cotton-producing sources in Multan, even the Japanese, who have relied for over 95 percent of their medium staple cotton needs on Pakistan, are not buying. One of the largest trading houses have this year not even bothered to go to their Multan office, which another source claims has been closed.

One of the fastest growing textile industries of Pakistan has been denim jeans. The export of such jeans, though partly blamed on the recession, has now been restricted and the EPB has put out advertisements wanting exporters to prove their 'past performance.' This, most exporters feel, will open up the door for another massive round of corruption within the EPB, whose officials are known to be well connected with 'export sharks' who can produce documentary evidence about any type of performance. If the situation is to be rescued and thousands of jobs saved over the next few months, the EPB must devise a transparent system based on minimum export prices and first come first serve basis. The establishment favours a 'past performance' system to maintain the status quo, a system that time and again has proved to force down prices and keep away new entrants, besides encouraging the development of value-added products within each sub-sector.

Take, for example, denim jeans. This product is made of anything between 7-single and 12-single cotton yarn. Pakistan is a world leader in these yarn counts and has a comparative advantage over all other nations on earth in this product. But the extreme low spending on training and education has meant that no entrepreneur has risked setting up a project that can manage good dyeing. One such undertaking in Karachi, namely Siddique Sons, has ventured into this sector and within the last ten years has become one of the richest undertakings, despite the fact that their quality is not internationally acceptable as 'the best.' Majority of denim is imported from countries like Hong Kong, who, ironically, import all their cotton yarn from Pakistan. Now with the new quotas in place, a major blow has been dealt to this industry.

It is also being said among EPB circles that next on the list is the entire range of knitted products that Pakistan produces. As this is a relatively new industry, good technology has helped to establish a very modern and competitive sector, with all the big names like Levis having purchasing offices within Pakistan. The EEC decision has also hit this sector hard. It is also confirmed that even cotton socks have been subjected to a 14 percent 'dumping surcharge,' an act the EEC undertakes only if a member State complains that unfair prices or special rebates are being provided. This means that even this item is now under watch and come April a quota could be clamped. If that happens the new and upcoming mills will come to a grinding halt. The expected quota will also hit a few dress sock mills who are already finding the going tough with a higher surcharge.

The question that needs to be answered is 'what is the government doing about the situation?' Businessmen say that with Pakistan producing 14 percent of the world's cotton, who should, for example, Britain alone provide a non-cotton producing nation like Hong Kong a higher quota for jeans greater than our entire European quota for this item.

The same is the case with almost all other similar items. There is no doubt that the government has not been working for 'the natives,' but just to save their own skins. Why must not, they reason, Pakistan get higher quota levels as compared to non-cotton producing nations.

The answer lies, without doubt, in the fact that Pakistan must now have a long-term textile policy if it is ever to have a say in the scheme of things as they unfold. The alternative is, as an official says, that we might, and most probably will be, simply forgotten. Optimists beware.

Nuclear Weapons Program Defended, Praised 93AS0308A Karachi JANG in Urdu 25 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Syed Shahid Pervez: "Pakistan's Nuclear Programs"]

[Text] When India exploded the nuclear bomb in 1974, the Pakistanis, who suffered through the 1971 crisis, had the first impression (correctly so) that India, after attaining nuclear technology, would prove to be the greatest danger to Pakistan. This was not just a misapprehension. This belief was based on hundreds of years of Hindu-Muslim conflict, confrontation, and prejudice, as well as the attitude of the Indian Government towards Pakistan after independence and some confrontations over Kashmir and Gulf of Kutch, in addition to the 1965 and 1971 wars. All these have created deep roots of hatred toward India. After the December 1971 war, India has proved to be more dangerous to Pakistan. Not only knowledgeable and intelligent Pakistanis know it, but even the average citizen has begun to feel strongly that Pakistan has not recovered from the December 1971 crisis. Pakistan has a danger hovering over it. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has raised the slogan, "We will try to get atomic technology even if we have to live on grass." Pakistani scientists were successful in breaking the atom during Ayub's era and were operating a nuclear power plant in Karachi very successfully. After the Indian atomic blast, this slogan became the voice of every Pakistani; they felt Pakistan must become a nuclear power and blast a bomb. Bhutto started this program with what resources we had at the time. However, in a short time, Pakistan's success in this area began to bother the United States badly. It was felt so greatly that the Jewish U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, threatened Bhutto at Lahore airport that if he did not close the nuclear program, he would suffer badly. The late Mr. Bhutto also told the nation at one time who wanted to eliminate him. But he never took the nation into confidence on this issue. Had he done so, he might not have been the head of the government now, at least he would have avoided the consequences he faced later [as published]. In any case, he advanced this program as necessary for our national defense and safety to a point that we can be very proud of. We can guess the importance of nuclear technology by the fact that several of our leaders made a successful nuclear program their party's election promise. All political parties who believe in national safety and security agree that Pakistan should not relinquish its nuclear program. Instead, Pakistan should blast a bomb. It is a political misfortune that most of our politicians prefer emotionalism over realism. They do not have the time to consider how they will make these promises good when they gain power. The big promises they make during their election meetings and rallies are never realized. They do not stop to think about what will happen if they fail to make good on their promises. As soon as they come to power, the veil over their eyes is removed. At the same time, they also lose their senses. When they face the facts, their emotionalism disappears. They do not even want to hear about those emotional promises and slogans that they had once made. That is when they begin to fall from power. The people are not willing to pardon them for breaking their promises and making wrong statements.

The fact is that it is the result of our political system, or the total lack of one, that we have been becoming the victim of political slogans and emotionalism for many years. This is an effort to fool the people and get their support, which is not appropriate in ethical politics. What they should do is present to the nation the real problems, then invite them to discuss these problems. The politicians should also present possible solutions to these problems, so that the people join them in discussing these and are able to face the facts. However, our traditional politicians never followed this, and they cannot get to power if they follow it. Every politician wants to survive based on his political ideology and its relation to the past. There is talk about Bhuttoism and some about Ziaism. Some politicians, when necessary, relate themselves to Quaid-i Azam, however, the number of such people has dwindled considerably now. He has been replaced by the so-called volunteers who had fought for Pakistan's independence. These people were still walking and holding their parents' fingers when Pakistan was established, or were still in a crib. Now they are claiming to be members of the group that fought for establishing Pakistan. What I want to say is that several of our politicians make the emotional claim that they will blast a bomb when elected. When they arrive in the corridors of power, though, they suddenly get scared. An atomic blast is a far cry; they get scared if we mention the name of Kahuta. The fact is that Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq were devoured for this same reason. The real responsibilities of the government and international pressure are felt only after one is in power. The price of criticizing opponents and political rivals is also understood once one is elected to power. People learn once they are in power how much difference there is between bragging and reality. The sagacity and farsightedness that Ziaul-Haq demonstrated in using the Afghanistan jihad to cover the Pakistani nuclear program was something only he could have accomplished. He was very sharp in such things. The "descendants" of the late general are trying to prove him the hero of the Afghan jihad, and this is derogatory to Zia-ul-Haq. With time, however, they will forgive him. The name of Zia-ul-Haq will always shine in context with the Afghan jihad.

The United States is now the only superpower in the world. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States and all Western countries are against Islam. The United States must look for a new goal, because the cold war and "hot wars" are gone. At the same time, the weapons industry in the United States is suffering from recession. The economic crisis of the United States forced Bush to leave office, and Clinton was successful on the promise that he would help rid the United States of its economic crisis. The United States has started an economic war.

At present, this war is being fought in Europe. Japan is confident because of its strong economic policy and industrial production; however, it will be entangled in this economic war soon. The United States is trying to open a new front, since the Islamic world is the goal of this war and Pakistan and Iran are only two countries among the Islamic nations that they are like a thorn in the side of the Western colonists. Any time there are problems for an Islamic country, these two nations come to help them and feel the pain and problems themselves. During the Gulf war, some of Pakistan's military experts and experts on international defense hinted that the United States would attack Iran and Pakistan after dealing with Iraq. The United States and Europe will never start a war in Europe. All these wars will be fought in Asia or Africa. At present, their eyes are on Asia, and Pakistan and Iran are the targets. That is why the United States and other military nations are accusing Pakistan and Iran of manufacturing weapons. They are expressing concern over it. The United States has imposed military and economic restrictions on Pakistan because of our nuclear program. Our defense production and military capabilities are affected by these restrictions. In spite of the fact that Pakistan has frozen its nuclear program, the West still declares it a terrorist nation. This is a very difficult situation. What we need now is to be realistic and to not go on another campaign. General Asif Nawaz, commander in chief of our armed forces, is a coolheaded general. Nobody cares what the politicians are doing or what they should be doing. No one has tried to

explain the very serious situation in our country. God forbid, if some calamity comes to our nation, will we be ready to face it? Or will we just write books about dead politicians? They should learn when they are still alive that it is important to know that, if someone unarmed stands in front of a gun, he will be a martyr. Still, we need a bullet to fight back. The situation we are facing cannot be avoided any more. We must understand this situation and plan a strategy. We hope the present confrontation between the government and the opposition does not lead to the sacrifice of our country's unity, and that because of this confrontational situation and campaigning against each other, our nuclear program is destroyed. Our enemies will, instead of destroying our program by attacking it, see it destroyed by internal strife. This program could guarantee protection for the whole Islamic world. We must protect ourselves from our external enemies, who are trying to enslave us and the whole Islamic world. There is no dearth of traitors who want to make our country their slave. However, a Quaid-i Azam is only born once in many centuries to free a nation. At this time, the question is not one of getting into power, but one of our nation's unity and safety, and this safety is guaranteed by nuclear capability. This capability is intolerable to our enemies. The government must pay attention and should view the opposition as the future government, not as its enemy. Both sides should use the proper protocol and patience to deal with each other. They should not be so afraid of one another that the whole situation becomes uncontrollable.

Standards of Both English, Urdu Said Dropping

93AS0264H Lahore THE NATION in English 18 Nov 92 p 8

[Article by Muzaffar Ali Syed: "The Urdu-English Dilemma in Education"]

[Text] The problems of education in Pakistan are manifold: managerial, economic, social and political. There are also some which we think we had resolved once and for all, a long time back, but they linger on in some form or another. Among this latter category, the place of English in our schools and colleges continues to cause a great deal of consternation although it may be said to have been theoretically settled with the Urduisation of all nationalized institutions, up to the Intermediate level, excepting a few which were allowed to run as (Englishmedium) "centers of excellence." This was a clear enough admission that the Urdu-medium schools and colleges would be qualitatively inferior. With the passage of time, the number of institutions exempted from the Urduisation policy has steadily increased and with the mushroom growth of privately managed Englishmedium and Cambridge-model schools, two parallel systems of education with their distinctly separate sets of characteristics are competing with each other in point of preference.

But while the one is going up in popularity, in spite of its exorbitant fees, the other is going down in quality. It is, in fact, no more a battle of mediums. According to a leading educationalist, Professor Karrar Hussain, it marks the country's bifurcation into a national duality: a nation of moneyed people designed to rule and a nation of destitutes destined to be ruled. Their separate schooling systems illustrate a widening gap between the two "nations" but nobody seems to worry about the anomaly. The English-medium schools put a great deal of stress on "accent and mannerism" while the Urduwallas breed a neglect of English.

Here lies a big paradox: English is important for one's "intellectual development" without which the products of the "woefully neglected chawanni schools" are rendered unable to cope with contemporary challenges, but the same subject is taught in such a manner at the expensive schools that most of its products are "intellectually impoverished." The first group is denied entry into the modern world whereas the other is "alienated" from its own society and culture.

Professor Karrar Hussain has also compared the product of current education with the generation which fought the battle for freedom. Then, it was a "great thrill and adventure" to learn English so as to be able to struggle against the Englishman through his own weapon. Our leaders imbibed the culture of the West but went to the roots of its strength, i.e., to prove that "freedom was our birth-right." They quoted Burke and Voltaire and other intellectuals of the West in support of their fight for independence, and "did not derive their arguments from their own oriental past." Also, as creative writers in

Urdu, even those who gained prominence in literature derived a great deal of benefit from their study of English and of European literature through English translations.

What motivated them to modernize their own literature instead of writing English poetry as the products of English education indulge in at present, has not been touched upon by the Professor. Perhaps a combination of national sentiment and cultural rootedness, catalyzed by the intellectual contact with the West, produced the result. But the parallel system of education prevailing today is incapable of creating anything of its own. "In future we shall have no Iqbal and no Faiz," bemoans Karrar Hussain. That is because the current lot coming out of either kind of schools and colleges are doubly ignorant. They are neither steeped in the "languages and cultures of the East nor of the West" and such a predicament could lead to hardly any creative combination.

No doubt, we have to learn a lot from the world for which our education has to be geared along modern concepts applied to our basic educational needs. It is something which is related to the quality of learning prior to the entry of students at the university or the professional colleges level. What and how do we teach up to the Higher Secondary School standard is the real problem. At present, we are producing candidates for medical and engineering colleges. But most of them do not make it, not only due to the limited number of seats at the professional colleges which could be raised to a certain limit, but also on account of their lack of aptitude and motivation for professional studies. These drop-outs come back to be fed into the general education at the degree level where, by virtue of their handicap, they can at the most attain a level of mediocrity. It is not realized by the educational authorities that the study of pure sciences, or humanities for that matter, requires a standard of achievement at least as good as medicine and engineering. There is no arrangement of extra coaching for these drop-outs and the ordinary fare of teaching is inadequate even for the other "normal" students who have been relatively consistent in the choice of their subjects.

The Urdu-wallas are the worst sufferers in this regard. Their fundamental weakness in English virtually disables them from pursuing a higher level of attainment in other subjects as well. It is not a simple matter of supplying them with more general books written or translated into Urdu. Their lower level of learning English is said to have bred in them a "sense of inferiority" which holds them back from going ahead.

It was virtually forgotten at the time of taking the decision on Urduising the government schools that English would still have to be taught in a meaningful manner. That is, even when it ceases to be a medium of instruction for other subjects, its status as the most-commonly used international language and as a vehicle of modern information and higher learning will not be changed. Its teaching as a second language will have to be

replaced by its teaching as a foreign language of major importance. Academically speaking, the traditional method of TESL [?teaching English as second language] will have to be substituted by the entirely new methods of TEFL [teaching English as foreign language] and maybe ESP, i.e., English for Special Purposes. The methodologies of all these categories of language teaching have undergone a veritable revolution in the recent decades but these are yet to be absorbed or even tried in our situation. Consequently, instead of making progress in this regard, we have allowed ourselves to be pushed further back into a retrogressive state of ignorance which is sometimes justified on the basis of national aspirations, as if this was what we wanted to become.

Of all the students who fail to qualify in the Secondary and Higher Secondary School examinations, at least eighty percent are calculated to have flunked in English. But instead of inquiring into this inadequacy and making arrangements for its redressal, demands have been raised to exclude English from the compulsory list of subjects in which a student is required to secure a pass-percentage of 33 marks. Some of the Boards of Secondary Education in the Punjab are even contemplating to reduce this minimum standard further, down to twenty-five percent, presumably under "great public demand" from the student community.

Such a surrender would be obviously disastrous, but if one looks at the level attained by the twenty percent who qualify in English, the situation would turn out to be even more painful. And this is in spite of the fact that the level of attainment is determined solely on the basis of a written test, which can be easily leaked out to be sold in the "examination market", if not tackled by unfair means adopted in the examination centers controlled by professional gangsters. There is no speech training in the classrooms, no oral comprehension, hardly any reading aloud and scarcely any supervised composition or home assignments. English is usually taught and learnt by the rote method as if it were a dead language like Sanskrit or Ancient Greek, or at best a classical language like Arabic and Persian which in our system has nothing at all to do with contemporary Arabia and Iran.

It is, of course, a tall order to teach English efficiently and effectively to a student population of millions who are admitted to the poorly equipped and under staffed chawanni schools as Professor Karrar Hussain calls them. But is this a case of mismanagement on the part of educational bureaucracy or is it part of a conscious conspiracy against the future of the country which always depends on the state of present-day education? Perhaps both, since the children of bureaucrats, political leaders and even the newly enriched class of people, do not study at such schools. And the management of such schools lies in the hands of those local dignitaries who have a vested interest in their retrogressive character. Here, neither English nor Urdu is taught with any measure of seriousness except by the dedicated few.

There is hardly any system of teacher-evaluation except on the basis of their usefulness for the administration.

The teacher-training schools and colleges, too, do not address themselves to the problems of language acquisition. The four-fold skills of language-learning, listening and speaking, reading and writing, are never allowed to integrate into a discipline. The first two elements are simply neglected while the other two are indifferently touched upon. The colonial system was accused of producing nothing but clerks but the post-colonial system of national education as been rendered incapable of producing even that. The wonder is that we are still alive as a nation, but if the current dilemma in our education persists any longer, there is grave danger ahead of receding into a kind of medievalism from which even the Gulf states are struggling to get away.

Society Said Filled With 'Cancer of Violence'

93AS0263C Karachi DAWN in English 21 Nov 92 p 13

[Article by Mazdak: "The Violence in Our Midst"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Over the last few months, there has been much shock and horror expressed over the revelations that the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] was running a number of torture cells where victims, including political opponents and dissident members, were subjected to unspeakable atrocities. And in the wake of the army crackdown in Sindh, there have been reports of officially condoned torture of suspected terrorists and their relatives.

In one specific case, a young man whose brother, a member of the MQM had gone underground was arrested and allegedly tortured by law enforcement agencies. His body was discovered a fortnight ago, and no action appears to have been taken to trace the killers.

Each fresh revelation underlines the fact that torture is a way of life and of death in Pakistani society. Everyone of us knows only too well the full implications of the term "intensive interrogation" which appears routinely and innocuously in the newspapers every second day. Suspects in the most petty crimes are subjected to beatings and all kinds of physical violence in police stations across the country; many of them, die, and some of these deaths are reported on page four of the national dailies.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Amnesty International have repeatedly documented incidents of torture committed by a succession of governments against political opponents and suspected criminals. Inflicting pain has been so institutionalised and internalised by the state apparatus that it has become standard operating procedure at every level of the police and sundry intelligence agencies. Indeed, state violence is the rule, not the exception. The lowest functionary of provincial and federal law enforcement agencies—whether in or out of uniform—considers it his God-given right to thrash or torture anybody who falls

into their clutches. And if a woman is unlucky enough to be detained, she is almost certain to be raped.

These abuses of human rights take place routinely because nobody is ever punished for perpetrating them. Once in a while, after a particularly vicious episode, there is a hue and cry; editorials are written; and human rights activists issue Press statements condemning this latest breach of the law by a government agency. To placate public sentiment, a low-level official is transferred, or even suspended; but soon, it is business as usual.

While pretending shock and horror at the discovery of the MQM torture cells, we conveniently close our eyes to the torture being inflicted on our citizens by the state. The fact is that this is a society with a very high tolerance for violence: government employees—paid by the tax-payers—inflict torment on their prisoners because, like it or not, there is a tacit consent among us that they be allowed to do so.

Other facets of violence in Pakistani society are around us every day of our lives in newspapers, in our families and on our streets. Hardly a day passes without small news items in the Press concerning individual, social and state violence. So accustomed have we become to headlines like "Man kills wife with axe" that we pass on the next story without raising an eyebrow. We see children stoning dogs in the streets; the smallest accident can, and often does, lead to an altercation and a fistfight; college and trade-union elections regularly result in shootouts.

These and many other manifestations of physical, verbal and emotional violence in our society have created an atmosphere where organised torture by official agencies is taken for granted. In one case where suspected terrorists were being tried, witnesses raised their shirts in court to show clear signs of torture in police custody. This evidence of brutality was ignored by the judge. In thousands of criminal cases as well as those with political

overtones, confessions are extracted under duress and accepted. The police, the public and the judiciary are all aware of the vicious tactics used to gather evidence, but there is a conspiracy of silence which promotes the myth that trials are fair, and are based on evidence that has been legitimately gathered by the prosecution.

While talking to even the most urbane police officer, there is no sense of guilt at the methods used by his subordinates to extract confessions. Repeatedly, he and his colleagues maintain that modern police methods will simply not work in Pakistan. This assertion has become dogma, and forms the basis of actual, day-to-day police investigation. The usual modus operandi in, say, a burglary is to round up all the servants and thrash them for days until one of them confesses. By the law of average, the police do get it right some of the time, but at the cost of torturing many innocent people. But since the victims are too terrorised to seek redress from a legal system tilted heavily in favour of the police, no corrective action is ever taken.

In this pervasive atmosphere of officially and socially condoned violence, it should come as no surprise when ethnic parties which began life as street gangs resort to terror and torture as instruments to impose their will on the political arena. Indeed, neither the state nor its coercive agencies can take a moral position on this issue when they have resorted to the same methods to further their ends. It is difficult to condemn the existence of MQM torture cells without also recognising that they are the direct outcome of the cancer of violence that is eating away at the heart of our society.

Recently, Khalid Ahmad wrote and directed a play on violence in society called "Yahan Se Shahar Ko Dekho." A brilliantly scathing condemnation of individual and state violence, the play is composed of a series of searing episodes that shock and numb the senses with their brutality and honesty. But the one image that haunts me is one of a group of young actors miming boys tormenting a puppy. I can still hear its howls of terror.